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The purpose of this thesis is to analyze a disaster
recovery (or contingency) plan currently in use at a
selected Department of Defense (DOD) computer facility, and
compare this plan to recovery plans that have been tested
during actual disasters.
Disaster plans, like military preparedness requires an
organization to be ready to do what it likely will never do
The plans may suffer from what researchers call predictive
validity. In the past five years, the U. S. Department of
Defense (DOD) has encountered repeated tests of its
Management Information System disaster plans.
B. OBJECTIVES
A major objective of this thesis will be to discover
what makes a disaster recovery (or contingency) plan work
and why. Equally as important is the analysis of why
established plans, or portions of these plans, were less
than effective when used during actual disaster scenarios.
Valuable lessons learned could assist computer facility
planners in identifying and correcting potential weaknesses
in their disaster recovery plans.
Computer facility disaster preparedness and related
topics are issues often paid little attention by computer
facility planners until a natural or man-made disaster
occurs. Disasters often strike unexpectedly, as witnessed
by: the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and the subsequent
abandonment of Clark Air Force Base, Philippines; the
destruction of Homestead Air Force Base, Florida and
surrounding communities by Hurricane Andrew; and the
terrorist bombing of New York's World Trade Center.
These incidents have provided information and lessons
learned for contingency planners and information managers,
and they have increased awareness levels concerning natural
disasters and computer security issues.
C. THE NEED FOR DISASTER RECOVERY PLANNING
The need for disaster recovery planning should be
apparent to information managers. Not only does disaster
planning help to save valuable equipment and jobs, but, more
importantly, serves to protect the lives of facility
personnel
.
1. The Bank of New York
Many organizations pay a heavy price by neglecting
to plan for disaster- related computer downtime. Following a
27- hour computer failure at the Bank of New York in 19 85,
the bank was forced to borrow 22 billion dollars from the
discount window of the Federal Reserve Bank. This loan
threw the weighted rate of federal funds out of balance and
cost the Bank of New York four to five billion dollars in
interest. In addition, senior officials of the bank were
summoned to appear before a Congressional investigating
committee to explain their lack of foresight in disaster
preparedness planning. (Toigo, 1989, p. 11)
2 . Government Regulations
It is evident that there are monetary penalties for
failing to develop and use a disaster recovery plan, but
there are U. S. Government regulations that may result in
punitive measures as well.
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 states
that businesses must take measures to guarantee the security
and integrity of assets- -interpreted to include accounting
and ledger information stored and processed on electronic
data processing systems.
The Act provides the capability to prosecute
individual managers and corporate executives for failure to
plan adequately for a disaster. Individual fines of up to
$10,000, five years in prison and corporate penalties of
more than one million dollars have been established.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A- 71
requires government agencies using data processing
facilities to take measures to safeguard these facilities.
Rigidly enforced as a matter of national security, the rule
has been extended to include government contractors and
subcontractors. (Toigo, 1989, p. 10)
D. DISCUSSION
1. Definitions
Toigo defines a disaster as:
...an interruption of business due to the loss or denial
cf the information assets required for normal
operations .. .a loss or interruption of the company's
data processing function, or to a loss of the data
itself. Loss of data can result from accidental or
intentional erasure or destruction of the media on which
data is recorded. This loss can be caused by a variety
of man-made or natural phenomena. (Toigo, 1989, p. 4)
2 . Disaster Size and Shape
The term disaster suggests a major calamity- -a
terrorist bombing, a hurricane or tidal wave, an earthquake,
perhaps a war- -but a disaster can come in many shapes and
sizes. All disasters may not be on the scale described
above. An accidental erasure of a hard disk at a small
organization may cause much damage and lead to an
unacceptable interruption of normal business operations.
The potential for lost revenue from an interruption
of operations due to a loss of information systems should
prompt all organizations, including the Department of
Defense (DOD) , to adequately train and prepare for a
disaster within their facility.
3 . Constants
There are some constants about disasters. One
constant is time. As businesses grow more dependent on
customized data processing systems, the timely restoration
of system-provided functions is critical.
According to a 1978 study by the University of
Minnesota, a data processing failure in a financial
institution one-half day in length will degrade normal
business activity by 13 percent for the two weeks following
the failure. A ten day outage will result in a 97 percent
loss of business activity. (Toigo, 1989, p. 5)
Although this thesis concentrates on Department of
Defense (DOD) computer facilities, the loss of computer
support and data processing capability is still a major
issue. Following a disaster, the less than timely
resumption of critical computer operations such as aircraft
maintenance, air-traffic control and logistics support could
result in a loss of lives, revenue and mission capability.
4. Coordinated Activities
Toigo defines disaster recovery as an organization's
ability to continue day-to-day operations through a series
of coordinated activities, despite an occurrence of
catastrophic nature. These activities may include:
• Emergency Action- -Procedures for reacting to crises
ranging from HALON (fire-extinguishing) activation
procedures to emergency evacuations.
• Notification- -Procedures for notifying relevant managers
in the event of a disaster. A contact list of home and
emergency telephone numbers is usually provided.
• Disaster Declaration- - Procedures pertaining to criteria
for determining whether the situation is in fact a
disaster, assessment of damage following a disaster,
and procedures for declaring a disaster and invoking the
(disaster recovery) plan.
• Systems Recovery Procedures- -Procedures to be followed
to restore critical and vital systems at emergency
service levels within a specified time frame in
accordance with the systems recovery strategy defined in
the disaster recovery plan.
• Network Recovery Procedures- - Procedures to reinstate
voice and data communications at emergency service
levels within a specified time frame in accordance with
the network recovery strategy defined in the plan.
• User Recovery Procedures- -Procedures for recovering
critical and vital user functions within a specified
time frame in accordance with planned strategy.
• Salvage Operations Procedures- -Procedures for salvaging
facilities, records and hardware, often including the
filing of insurance claims and the determination of the
feasibility of reoccupying the disaster site.
• Relocation Procedures -- Procedures for relocating
emergency operations (system, network and user) to the
original or a new facility, and the restoration of
normal service levels.
5. Phases of Disaster Recovery-
There are several distinct phases of disaster
recovery. A reference document on disaster recovery
planning used terms such as planning, preparation,
implementation and recovery to refer to disaster recovery
plan formulation and design as well as its implementation.
(Hural, 1992, p. 5)
In contrast, Toigo uses the phrases evacuation,
recovery and relocation/reentry in reference to the reaction
and recovery from an actual disaster, and assumes that a
disaster recovery plan is already in place.
Discussion is required on each of these phases as
they relate to fundamental portions of disaster recovery
planning:
Planning Phase- -This phase of the disaster recovery
plan is used to develop the programs, policies and
procedures to be put into operation to reduce the effect of
a natural disaster on an organization's information system.
Preparation Phase- -The preparation phase implements
the procedures identified by the requirements in the
planning phase, including actions to be taken in the event
that advance notification of an impending disaster is
available. It also contains standard procedures to be
followed on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in order to be
prepared should a disaster occur without prior or advance
notice. Its stated purpose is to allow the organization to
respond to the impending threat of a disaster, and includes
a physical inventory of organizational assets, a risk
assessment in order to determine the threats to an
organization's information system, alternative technologies
that can be used in the event of a disaster, and disaster
recovery team identification and training.
Implementation Phase- -This phase of the plan
describes the procedures to be followed when it has been
determined to initiate the disaster recovery plan. The
implementation phase moves the organization from the non-
critical preparation phase into the full scale emergency
activation of the disaster recovery plan. Similar to the
mishap plan found in Naval aviation aircraft squadrons, it
should be a detailed document with precise steps to follow
in the event of an emergency.
This phase is the litmus test as to the overall
effectiveness of an organization's disaster recovery
planning. To be successful at this phase, the plan must be
easy to read with clear objectives, have disaster teams
identified and ready to proceed with their stated tasks, and
contain enough information so that a backup/alternate user
will be able to successfully follow the directions contained
within the plan.
Recovery Phase- -This phase of plan development
outlines procedures that will be performed to return the
organization to its original operating level after a
disaster has occurred.
Evacuation Phase- -This segment of the plan concerns
the first three sections of the activities listed above.
The evacuation phase contains procedures for reacting to a
crisis, notifying personnel in the event of a disaster,
determining if a disaster should be declared and
implementation of the disaster recovery plan.
Recovery Project or Phase- -This phase covers the
coordinated activities listed below:
• Critical systems are restored at reduced performance
levels
.
• Voice and data communications are reinstated at
emergency levels.
• Vital user functions are recovered.
• Facilities, records and hardware are salvaged, all
within a specified time frame.
Relocation Project or Phase- -Contains procedures for
relocation emergency operations (system, network and user)
to the original or new facility. The new facility may be a
"cold site" (a site with little or no existing hardware and
equipment) , or a "hot site" (an existing computer facility,
fully equipped and ready to conduct operations)
.
E . METHODOLOGY
Disaster preparedness in the commercial sector is
examined in the World Trade Center segment of this thesis.
Emphasis is placed on the terrorist incident's impact on
personal computer users, local area networks and backup
procedures used by affected firms.
Also studied are Clark and Homestead Air Force Bases,
two DOD installations whose computer facilities' contingency
plans were tested by natural disasters. Toigo's three
disaster phases provide the structure for an examination of
planning and recovery methods associated with these
incidents
.
The DFAS/DITSO Kansas City, Missouri contingency plan
serves as a model for a detailed analysis conforming to an
outline of a generic disaster preparedness plan.
Sources of information include interviews, topical
publications, magazine articles, DFAS/DITSO Kansas City's
contingency plan and written accounts by participating
personnel
Information pertaining to the two U. S. Air Force Bases
was largely obtained during interviews with participants due
to a scarcity of official documentation. Most of the Clark
AFE disaster plan was lost following closure of the base;
Homestead's contingency documentation was destroyed during
the disaster. Discussions with DFAS/DITSO Kansas City
contingency planners, employees and other facility personnel
10
aided in the preparation of the contingency planning model.
While in the process of obtaining information, several
interviewees requested that they remain anonymous, and were
not referred to by name within the thesis.
11
II. WORLD TRADE CENTER INCIDENT
A. MULTI- LEVEL PLANNING
The bomb explosion at the World Trade Center emphasizes
the need for disaster planning at all levels of computing-
-
from the mainframe down to the individual personal computer
(PC) user. Offices in the Trade Center that used disaster
recovery plans experienced short computer downtimes and
minimal lost: productivity as a result of the bombing.
(Fisher, 1993, p. 10)
Kemper, a Chicago-based securities firm, had a
backup plan to protect vital data processed by its World
Trade Center office. Nightly, Kemper automatically
transferred copies of data stored by its three IBM computers
to a backup computer located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
When Kemper employees reported for work at a
temporary work location on the Monday following the
explosion, their customers' vital records were safe, and
work resumed with little interruption. (Fisher, 1993,
p. 10)
12
1. Personal Computer Disaster Recovery
However, not all Trade Center-based firms' computer
operations escaped the blast. PC users suffered losses in
productivity during the period immediately following the
explosion. Four days after the incident, as firefighters
sifted through the debris, office workers tried to rescue
PCs from their ravaged workspaces. (Fisher, 1993, p. 11)
Tom Abruzzo, senior project manager for Contingency
Planning Research Inc., stated:
. . .mainframe and mini (computer) users have hot sites to
recreate their operations, but most PC users don't have
a :y idea of what to do if they have no access to their
computer. (Fisher, 1993, p. 11)
An unidentified PC user said:
Every night, I'm putting a backup tape in my pocket and
taking it home. (Fisher, 1993, p. 11)
a. PC and LAN Lessons Learned
Some PC local area network (LAN) managers and
users learned valuable lessons from the World Trade Center
bombing. Kenneth Horner, a partner at Deloitte & Touche in
the Trade Center's Tower No. 1, was at lunch when the bomb
went off. The Big Six accounting firm evacuated its people
from floors 93 to 101 and soon began shifting operations to
a company site in mid- town Manhattan. "We had a disaster
recovery plan in place and contingency planning for several
clients and ourselves," Horner said.
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Returning to the office as soon as possible after
the explosion, employees were able to retrieve hard disks
and some network file servers from Tower No. 1. Using
network- compatible Macintosh computers, disabled LANs were
restored fairly quickly. By Monday morning, three days
after the blast, Deloitte & Touche was back up and running.
Horner stated: "We had a loss of productivity and a large
amount of expense, but no client problems." (Leeke, 1993,
p. 8)
2. Distributed Architectures
The majority of operations that were disrupted by
the bombing of the World Trade Center were based on
distributed systems and local -area network topologies. This
has led information systems executives and industry
observers to speculate that the incident will force
companies to pay even greater attention to protecting
mission- critical applications on distributed architectures.
(Hoffman, 1993, p. 67)
The Chase Manhattan Bank was forced to transfer 100
financial services employees and reroute phone lines to the
Chase Plaza and other New York locations after the bomb
blast. Craig D. Goldman, senior vice president and chief
information officer said:
There's no question that anytime you have a disaster
like this, people become much more aware of the rigors
of protecting distributed technology... (Hoffman, 1993,
p. 67)
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Most large Trade Center companies with past disaster
recovery experience successfully carried over their
expertise to distributed architectures preceding the World
Trade Center bombing. However, smaller firms with no prior
experience were less fortunate. (Hoffman, 1993, p. 67)
3 . Backups
The New York Clearing House Association (NYCH)
,
which clears billions of dollars in international
transactions for member banks daily, had ten members in the
Trace Center when the bombing occurred. Four of those banks
endt d up using NYCH backup facilities in Manhattan to
complete $90 billion dollars in transactions on the day of
the bombing. (Hoffman, 1993, p. 67)
Tari Schroeder, chief executive officer at
Contingency Planning Research, Inc., stated that, based on
early investigations among World Trade Center tenants, most
of the organizations that suffered data losses or
disruptions to distributed systems were backing up data only
on a weekly or monthly basis. (Hoffman, 1993, p. 67)
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According to Jerome J. Jordan, vice-president of
computer operations for the Trade Center-based Commodities
Exchange, Inc. (Comex) , all trading information is
"shadowed" or backed up and routed over an LU6 . 2 protocol
network to computers at a backup facility. As a result,
Comex did not lose any data. (Hoffman, 1993, p. 67)
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III. CLARK AIR FORCE BASE INCIDENT
A. BACKGROUND
Clark Air Force Base (AFB) , located on the island of
Luzon, Republic of the Philippines (RP) , was regarded as
paradise by most of the U. S. Air Force personnel fortunate
enough to be assigned there. Lush tropical surroundings, a
friendly native population and a low cost of living helped
make Clark a near- ideal duty location for its American
occupants
.
The base enjoyed a long and colorful history. Clark was
originally founded as Fort Stotsenberg in 1903, following
the United States' possession of the Philippines after the
Spanish-American War. Much of General Douglas MacArthur's
ill-fated Philippine Air Force was destroyed at Clark AFB by
the invading Japanese during the dark days of late December,
1941. Thousands of U. S. servicemen spent a few wild days
of Rest and Recreation (R&R) from the Vietnam War at Clark
and its adjacent Philippine community, Angeles City.
More recently, Clark housed the personnel, aircraft, and
equipment of the U. S. 13th Air Force, the 353rd Operations
Wing, other supporting units, and thousands of dependent
family members.
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It was a life in paradise that, as of April 2, 1991,
could be measured in days, for Clark AFB lay ten miles from
a long -dormant volcano named Mount Pinatubo.
B. "BLACK SATURDAY"
The beginning of the end of the U. S. Air Force's
presence at Clark AFB came on Saturday, June 15, 1991, at
5:55 a.m. local time. In the months since, a skeleton crew
left there as caretakers has begun calling that day "Black
Saturday" . Those who were there say that what they saw will
stay with them all their lives.
At that hour came the explosion of Mount Pinatubo, which
took place at the same moment that a violent tropical storm,
Typhoon Yunya, was sweeping in from the sea and bearing down
on the Philippine Islands. Witnesses say they saw a wall of
ash and soot some five miles wide rising directly into the
typhoon's swirling winds and rain.
Rather than continuing to climb, as did the smaller
plumes of previous days, the debris from this eruption began
spreading horizontally. Clark AFB lay directly in its path.
At Clark, U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) volcano experts
warned Air Force officials that the base could be threatened
by pyroclastic flows- - streams of molten ash and rock
superheated to 900 degrees Celsius and moving at speeds of
up to 100 miles an hour. Most of a 1, 500-member, mission-
essential Air Force team was evacuated to safety at an
18
agricultural college on the Philippine- controlled portion of
the base. Only a few members were left at Clark in the
early afternoon, when the sky turned black and it began
raining stones.
"They were just like hailstones. It was incredible,"
said SMSgt Arthur Futch, a member of the Air Force's
mission- essential team who stayed at Clark throughout the
initial evacuation and its months -long aftermath. Falling
rocks and ash muffled all sound. Sergeant Futch said it
"was like a reverse snowstorm, " a winter scene with
everything turning black instead of white.
By 2:30 p.m., the situation for those still at Clark
proper was clearly untenable. All remaining personnel were
taken to the agricultural college. A natural disaster had
just forced the U. S. to take the unprecedented step of
mounting a complete, immediate evacuation of a major
military installation, leaving behind hundreds of millions
of dollars' worth of equipment and personal possessions.
When the worst part of the ash fall was over, 100
buildings at Clark had been destroyed and the base had
sustained more than $300 million in damage. (Grier, 1992,
p. 56)
19
C. "ERUPTION OF THE CENTURY"
Filipino victims who dwelt near the volcano recalled
that the erupting volcano sounded like an enormous stampede
was occurring. The earth shook. Ash clouds billowed miles
into the sky, transforming day into night. Lahar (volcanic
mud) coated the surrounding countryside, destroying
thousands of homes, roads, and bridges in the central Luzon
plain.
The eruption drove the Aetas, a Stone Age- like tribe
virtually untouched by modern civilization, from the
mountain craters in which they had lived. Driven into the
lowlands by the volcano, they quickly fell prey to diseases,
contracted from their new environment, for which they had no
natural immunity. Many died, refusing medical care.
(Dacaney, 1991, p. 20)
After the Pinatubo eruption, many Filipinos claimed that
God punished the Philippines because of the U. S. bases.
"The U. S. war facilities helped in the transformation of
Olongapo and Angeles into sin cities," insisted Lita
Tabelan, a 22 -year old Filipino. "What happened to us




Another Filipino was convinced that the Pinatubo
eruption was God's punishment for sinners. "Look at what
happened to my neighbor," a 33-year old resident of a small
Luzon farming community said, "He has plenty of wives. It
must be the reason why his house was totally destroyed
during the eruption." (Dacaney, 1991, p. 54)
D. THE "RING OF FIRE"
Mt . Pinatubo was considered one of the least active
volcanos in what volcanologists call the Pacific "Ring of
Fir , " a belt of seismic activity stretching from Japan
sou:. hward. Though it was one of the least active, Pinatubo
was by no means considered less dangerous.
According to data from the Smithsonian Institution's
Global Volcanism Network, eleven of the fourteen largest
eruptions of the last two hundred years involved long-
dormant volcanoes, including the deadliest eruption of
modern times, the 1883 eruption of Krakatoa, which killed
36,000 people in what is now Indonesia. (Grier, 1992,
p. 58)
Geologically, the Philippines is one of the most active
areas of the world. In July 1990, an earthquake killed
1,621 people on Luzon, and scientists from the Philippine
Institute of Volcanology and Seismology think this tremor




The first hints that something was amiss with the
mountain came in the early spring of 1991. On April 2, an
explosion from Pinatubo's southern region spread ash across
the countryside up to ten kilometers away from the mountain.
(Grier, 1992, p. 58)
E. AIR FORCE REACTION
Concerned about Philippine scientists' reports of
"seismic swarm" tremors and indications of rising molten
lava around Mt . Pinatubo, U. S. Air Force officials
requested expert help from the U. S. Geological Survey.
Within days after arriving on April 23, a USGS team reported
that a major eruption was imminent, but were unable to
predict the exact date.
Throughout May 1991, seismic tremors in the Pinatubo
region grew stronger, appearing to emanate from points
closer to the surface. By early June, experts warned that a
major explosion could occur at any time. (Grier, 1992,
p. 58)
F. "FIERY VIGIL"
Alarmed by increasing volcanic activity, Clark AFB
officials began preparing for evacuation. By June 8, each
American household had received a detailed evacuation
pariphlet, giving instructions on what to do, what to bring,
and what to leave behind.
22
Air Force aircraft were the first items to go. Although
the Air Force's drawdown had removed two squadrons of
fighter jets from the base, many aircraft remained to be
flown out. On Sunday, June 9, just about everything left on
the Clark flight line- -helicopters and transport aircraft-
-
moved to Cubi Point Naval Air Station, minutes away by air
on Luzon's Bataan Peninsula.
By early morning on June 9, USGS experts predicted a
majcr eruption within twenty- four hours. Two hours later,
Pinatubo spat ash and rocks skyward. Although the debris
was carried away from Clark, the Base Commander ordered a
general evacuation of all married servicemen and women,
their families, and other "non-essential" personnel.
(Grier, 1992, p. 58)
After several false alarms, the evacuation announcement
was broadcast at 5:00 a.m. on June 9 by the base's Armed
Forces Radio Network. By 6:00 p.m. the first of three
organized convoys of Clark residents had formed up to
transit the fifty-mile, two-lane road to the U. S. Naval
Base at Subic Bay, also on the Bataan Peninsula. Left
behind at Clark were 1,500 "mission- essential " personnel,
slightly more than half of them Air Force security
pol icemen.
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Among the convoy to Subic Bay was Air Force MSgt Joseph
Licci, Chief of the Data Processing Center (DPC) at Clark
AFB, and his family. Remaining at Clark to operate the DPC
were five unmarried Air Force Data Processing technicians:
SSgt Charles Reidy, in temporary command of the Center, and
four other airmen. MSgt Licci and SSgt Reidy were two major
sources of thesis information about U. S. Air Force
contingency planning efforts at Clark AFB during the Mt
.
Pinatubo disaster.
This mass withdrawal, code -named "Fiery Vigil", saw
14,000 Americans move from Clark to relative safety at Subic
Bay. Most of them would never return.
On November 26, 1991, after months of unsuccessful
negotiations with the Philippine government over the
continued presence of U. S. bases in the Philippines, Clark
AFB was turned over to the Filipinos. (Grier, 1992, p. 56)
G. CLARK AFB DATA PROCESSING CENTER
Operating 24 hours a day, seven aays a week, the Clark
AFB Data Processing Center (DPC) provided mainframe computer
support to all host/tenant organizations at the base. Other
commands also used the Clark DPC: Camp Wallace Air Station,
Camp O'Donnell, and the American Embassy at Manila.
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Sixty on-base customers and 300 user terminals were
served by the DPC's Sperry S1100/60 mainframe, including:
Aircraft Maintenance, Military and Civilian Personnel,
Merchandise Control and Accounting/Finance. An on-site tape
library provided secure storage for over 5000 magnetic disk
tapes.
The Center had an Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) to
provide emergency power to the mainframe and environmental
control systems should the primary electrical power source
be interrupted. (Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
1. Data Backup and Off -Site Storage Procedures
Off -site storage for backup computer tapes was
located in a secure, climate- controlled building miles from
the DPC on the opposite side of Clark AFB. The backup tape
library consisted of 110 tapes containing current program
files and user databases.
As required by Air Force Regulation 700-7, full
system backups were performed on a weekly basis. "SAVEALL"
tapes, magnetic tapes containing the previous week's data
transactions, were unloaded from the mainframe computer and
moved to off -site storage the following day. New SAVEALL
tapes were then inserted for backup of the current week's
processing activities.
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Release tapes, tapes containing applications program
updates from the Air Force's Standard System Center were
also maintained in off -site storage.
To augment the weekly SAVEALL backup routine,
nightly "SAVE" backups were performed and transported off-
site. SAVEs recorded only databases updated during the
day's activities. SAVE and SAVEALL procedures combined to
give the Clark DPC a complete backup of all daily and weekly
data transactions. (Clark AFB DPC Operating Instruction
123-1, Disaster & Emergency Plan, 1988)
In addition to backup tapes, the DPC also stored
copies of their Operating Instructions (01) , contingency
plan, extra paper, diskettes, and office supplies for
emergency use.
2. Transportable Shelter System
Until the spring of 1991, a mobile, self-contained
mainframe computer, the Transportable Shelter System (TSS)
was located at the Clark DPC. Should Clark's Sperry
S1100/60 mainframe computer be rendered inoperative for a
prolonged period, the TSS was designed to function as the
DPC's alternate processing site.
Contained in four shelters, the TSS also housed user
terminals, peripheral devices, air-conditioning/humidifier
units and three electrical power generators.
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The TSS was removed in February 1991. After the TSS
departed, the Clark DPC was forced to relocate to other Air
Force DPCs to satisfy its alternate site processing
requirements. (Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
H. CLARK DPC CONTINGENCY PLANNING
1. Pre-Disaster Planning
The Clark DPC had prepared a contingency plan prior
to the Pinatubo disaster. Labeled the Disaster and
Emergency Plan (D&E) , the document was designed in
accordance with Air Force 700 Series Regulations. These
regulations require that data processing centers have D&E
plans that address real and potential threats to facilities
and personnel
.
As part of plan preparation, a detailed risk
analysis was performed. Natural disasters identified as
threats were: fires, floods, severe storms, earthquakes and
typhoons. Volcanoes were not considered a plausible threat
to the facility. MSgt Licci stated:
In April '91 the volcano started smoking. Not too many
people thought much about it at first. Then it started
smoking more and more, and folks became alarmed. In
mid-May it started to discharge grey smoke, and base
officials called in some volcano experts. (Interview,
MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
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Noting Clark AFB's mounting tension over the restive
mountain, Licci began a review of the DPC's contingency
documents. MSgt Licci:
I started a review of our D&E plan, and reviewed all our
OIs. I guess we at the DPC had good timing, because
between February and May 19 91 we had initiated a
complete rewrite of all our contingency documentation.
We were pretty current on our procedures when the
mountain started to get worse. (Interview, MSgt Licci,
USAF, 1993)
2. Volcano Readiness Levels
In May 1991, the Clark AFB Disaster Preparedness
Office, an Air Force agency dedicated to overall base
disaster readiness and contingency planning, distributed
volcano guidance to all host/tenant commands, uniformed
personnel and dependents.
The booklet described five levels of volcanic
activity, listed below:
• Level l--No immediate danger of eruption, volcano not
smoking.
• Level 2- -Increased danger of eruption, volcano smoking.
• Level 3 --Danger of eruption within two weeks.
• Level 4- -Danger of eruption within two days.
• Level 5 --Danger of eruption within hours/actual
eruption.
The Clark DPC, along with all other tenant commands,
tailored their disaster preparedness measures to conform to
these volcanic activity levels.
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By the time these checklists were printed and
distributed throughout the base, Pinatubo was ominously
smoking, and Clark had been placed into a Level 2 readiness
condition. (Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
3. The "Volcano" Plan
As the DPC had no procedures regarding volcanic
activity, MSgt Licci quickly prepared a "Volcano" plan.
Drafted during Clark's Level 2 volcano readiness condition,
this improvised plan contained volcano- specif ic procedures
and would augment the existing contingency plan.
Using his in-depth knowledge of DPC operations, MSgt
Licci tailored the Volcano Plan to take advantage of the
DPC's strengths: experienced personnel, a proven data backup
system, secure off-site storage and available alternate
processing sites.
a. Final Preparations
When Level 3 was announced, the DPC made final
preparations for the imminent eruption. Essential and non-
essential personnel were chosen and briefed. Specialized
processing teams were formed.
Five unmarried airmen were classified as
essential, and were to continue operations at the DPC after
the general evacuation. Non-essential personnel and their
families would evacuate when directed.
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Several DPC members were designated as the
alternate site processing team. Alternate processing sites
were informed of the current situation; off-site processing
agreements were reviewed and updated. Clark's primary
alternate processing site was Kadena AFB, Okinawa.
Secondary sites were Yokota AFB, Japan or Osan AFB, Korea.
(Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
4. Plan Innovations
Due to the rapidly- deteriorating situation and lack
of volcano- related procedures, DPC personnel had to innovate
and plan "on the fly".
MSgt Licci:
...if/when the volcano went off, we wouldn't have the
time to go to the off-site tape library, get the tapes
and boogy before it was too late, so I initiated a
change to our (D&E) procedures. (Interview, MSgt Licci,
USAF, 199 3)
Using six large (3'x3'x3') aluminum containers left
over from the Transportable Shelter System (TSS) , DPC
personnel retrieved the most current backup tapes from
stcrage, placed them into the airtight containers and
secured them within the DPC. Backup tapes stored inside the
containers were updated daily. Copies of contingency
documentation, personnel rosters and extra supplies were
also sealed inside the containers.
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Should the volcano erupt, these "bug- out kits", as
they were called, would be loaded onto an Air Force vehicle
and moved as far from danger as possible, for eventual air
transport to an alternate processing site. An escape route
was formulated and rehearsed, and the vehicle kept in
readiness for the operation. (Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF,
1993)
5. Evacuation
The Volcano Plan called for migration to an
alternate site when Level 4 conditions were placed into
effect. To prepare for this eventuality, MSgt Licci ensured
that
:
• Temporary duty (TDY) orders were prepared for the
alternate site processing team.
• Kadena AFB was notified of the team's impending arrival.
• Team members were briefed and prepared to travel to the
alternate site.
• Satellite communications with alternate sites had been
tested using the base's fixed SATCOM facility.
However, when Level 4 came into effect a senior DPC
official altered the Volcano Plan, cancelling the alternate
site team's move to Kadena AFB. Soon after, on June 9, the




With non-essential personnel evacuating to Subic Bay,
Air Force SSgt Charles Reidy, assisted by four other airmen,
was nominally in charge of the Clark DPC. Data processing
operations resumed at reduced levels due to the limited
number of Center personnel remaining and the departure of
most of the DPC's customers. Backup tapes were updated
daily, secured in the "bug- out kits" and locked in the DPC
supply room.
Everything pertaining to the Volcano and D&E plans had
been accomplished. All that remained was to continue daily
operations, subsist on Meals Ready-to-Eat (MRE) and wait for
the volcano to erupt. It was not a long wait. (Interview,
SSgt Reidy, USAF, 1993)
1. Pinatubo Erupts
Unknown to SSgt Reidy and the other remaining Air
Force personnel at Clark AFB, the pressure inside Pinatubo
kept building. On Wednesday, June 12, it blew a column of
ash into a mushroom cloud 60,000 feet high. Most of the
mission- essential crew were moved to temporary safety at the
Pampanga Agricultural College on the slope of Mount Arayat,
several miles from Clark AFB. Luckily, the ash drifted away
frcm Clark. Over the next few days, however, threatening
seismic activity caused base personnel to sound eight
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premature evacuation sirens, only to reverse each order
within a short time. (Grier, 1992, p. 59)
SSgt Reidy, on duty at the DPC, stated:
The first time we were ordered to evacuate (June 12), we
shut down the facility using emergency power down
procedures found in the D&E plan. We grabbed the backup
tapes, jumped in our vehicle and ran.... (Interview,
SSgt Reidy, USAF, 1993)
After returning to the Center, SSgt Reidy restored
power to the mainframe and attempted to resume processing.
Immediately, minor problems developed. Magnetic tape
"diskpacks" (tape storage and retrieval devices) failed to
operate correctly, due to the instantaneous removal of
electrical power caused by the emergency power down
procedure. Although this condition had been encountered
before during practice exercises, SSgt Reidy elected to
follow the Volcano Plan and use normal power down procedures
for the next actual (or premature) evacuation.
On June 15 came Black Saturday and the freak
combination of massive volcanic eruption and typhoon. After
four premature evacuations on Saturday alone, the volcano
finally left no doubt as to the necessity of moving Clark's
remaining Air Force personnel to safety.
SSrt Reidy:
When the volcano really blew (June 15) we loaded the
backup tapes from the supply room and left. The Volcano
Plan called for us to leave the mainframe operating to
get away from problems with disk storage. Peripheral
devices were powered down using normal procedures. I
had a feeling we wouldn't be back. (Interview, SSgt
Reidy, USAF, 1993)
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Power down procedures complete, SSgt Reidy mustered
his personnel, secured the DPC and evacuated to the
Agricultural College.
During the eruption, Pinatubo's ash mixed with the
typhoon's downpour and turned into falling concrete,
violently pummeling the now-deserted air base. From 1:30
p.m. Saturday onward, fifteen hours of violent explosions
ripped the volcano. Its summit collapsed into the rising,
fiery magma and was blown back into the air. Later, when
the mountain had subsided, scientists judged that they had
just witnessed the most powerful volcanic eruption of this
century. (Grier, 1992, p. 59)
J. RECOVERY PHASE
U. S. personnel weren't gone for long. A vanguard
security force was back on the base by Sunday morning, June
16, barely twelve hours after the last man had left. They
returned to something far different from what they had left.
A lush tropical landscape had been turned into a
moonscape. Everything was buried under four to eight inches
of rapidly hardening ash. Trees resembled big upright
pencils, lacking branches or leaves. The weight of the ash
and the undermining force of the earth tremors had destroyed
111 buildings, including a gym, seven warehouses, part of
the powerplant, and all of the hardened aircraft shelters.
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The bookstore and the NCO club had been flattened by-
rapid mud flows called lahars. Superhot pyroclastic flow
from the volcano had come close to the base, traveling down
a riverbed to within a few hundred yards of base housing.
(Grier, 1992, p. 59)
After the eruption had subsided, SSgt Reidy and another
airman traveled by truck to the Naval Air Station at Cubi
Point. At Cubi they, along with the backup tapes boarded an
aircraft that would transport them to Kadena AFB, Clark's
alternate processing site.
1. Res'iming Operations
Upon SSgt Reidy' s return to Clark from Kadena AFB,
he and his DPC crew began the arduous task of resuming
operations to support the 1,500 Air Force and civilian
personnel left at Clark. Although covered with six inches
of cement-like ash, the facility was otherwise undamaged.
SSgt Reidy stated:
It was surprising to come back a few days after- -the
place looked like the surface of the moon. (Interview,
SSgt Reidy, USAF, 1993)
On reentering the mainframe computer room, the DPC
staff was surprised to discover the mainframe operating as
they had left it. The UPS had functioned perfectly,
supplying power to the mainframe and environmental control
units throughout the eruption and ash fall that followed.
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During this period, the DPC operated the mainframe
computer, a communications front -end processor, three
personal computers (PC) , two Zenith 248 model computers that
served as terminals and two line printers.
Normal on-site processing functions (Payroll,
Personnel and Accounting/Finance data transactions) were
resumed within one week following the eruption.
Accessing the few remaining telephone lines between
Cubi Point and Clark, the DPC also supplied processing
support for Air Force aircraft flying relief missions from
NAS Cubi Point. Connected by modem with computer terminals
in Cubi, the DPC processed Aircraft Maintenance and
Administrative data for transient aircraft and their crews.
Initial communications with Clark's alternate site
at Kadena AFB were less than satisfactory.
SSgt Reidy:
Data processing personnel at Kadena attempted to
transfer files to Clark using the Defense Data Network
(DDN) , but the most important files (Personnel,
Accounting and Finance, Aircraft Maintenance) were too
large for existing data transfer protocols. Eventually,
Kadena communicators set up a data base schema that
would accept the large size of our most important files.
(Interview, SSgt Reidy, USAF, 1993)
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a. Sxibic Processing Operations
Arriving at Subic Bay, MSgt Licci was tasked to
provide temporary Accounting/Finance and Personnel data
support for the evacuees. Two Navy computer terminals and
peripheral devices were allocated for Air Force use.
MSgt Licci unsuccessfully attempted to obtain an Air Force
mobile satellite communications van to uplink via satellite
with Kadena AFB. MSgt Licci said:
I wanted to get a mobile satellite- capable comm van so
we could establish data circuits from Subic to Kadena,
and the States, but had no luck. The only way I could
get any service to the terminals was to get a land- line
link between Subic and Clark, and use the SATCOM
facility at Clark to link to Denver, Colorado for
Accounting/Finance. (Interview, MSgt Licci, USAF, 1993)
Licci also helped Personnel users link their
terminals with Air Force Personnel headquarters at Randolph
AFB , Texas
.
After Black Saturday (June 15) and the disabling
of the Clark SATCOM facility, automated processing of any
type became impossible. On Sunday, June 16, MSgt Licci and
his family, along with an estimated 22,000 evacuees, boarded
Navy ships enroute to the United States.
37
K. RELOCATION PHASE
Back at Clark, life was not returning to normal. As
damage -control teams set to work, they discovered a shortage
of a key item- -shovels for clearing ash from roofs,
sidewalks and roads. Officials placed a rush order for 200
snow shovels from Elmendorf AFB, Alaska. Clark, meanwhile,
turned one of its damaged workshops into a shovel factory,
churning out 800 shovels in a few weeks.
Ash falls and tremors continued to hit the area. Many
members of the mission- essential crew spent the nights in
their cars instead of buildings, which were in danger of
collapsing
.
Three hundred Filipino contract workers were hired to
clean up, but much of their time was spent packing the
household goods of evacuees.
Base security continued to be a concern. SMSgt Futch, a
member of the mission-essential team said:
Looting was a problem, though it was not being done on
the scale people have been led to believe. (Grier,
1992, p. 60)
After the evacuation began, the base experienced ninety- six
break- ins in government buildings and another 2 00 in the
base housing area. (Grier, 1992, p. 60)
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The Clark Data Processing Center was located well inside
the base perimeter and was not an easy target for thieves.
For whatever reason, Filipino looters had bypassed the
facility.
During this period, SSgt Reidy and the DPC staff
continued their data processing activities, while assuming
the additional tasking requirements of Civil Engineering
personnel who had arrived to assess post -eruption damage.
The DPC assisted engineers by transcribing to magnetic tape
reports of monetary damage, repair costs and other reports.
Using a temporary microwave communications link set up after
the eruption, DPC personnel transmitted this data to Kadena
AFB for further transfer to the United States.
Once the decision to abandon Clark AFB was made, DPC
personnel were among the last to leave. The Sperry
mainframe computer, peripherals, magnetic tapes and other
supplies was shipped to Andersen AFB, Guam. The Center
provided limited administrative computer support until
November 26, 1991, when they closed and locked the facility
for the last time.
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L. CONCLUSIONS
Until April 2, 1991, the Clark AFB Data Processing
Center, along with the rest of the personnel stationed at
the air base, had not considered volcanoes a threat. It was
a reasonable assumption, as Pinatubo had not shown any signs
of volcanic activity for over 200 years.
A lack of existing guidance led to the formulation and
use of imaginative methods to cope with Mt . Pinatubo'
s
eruption.
The Volcano Plan was a masterpiece of innovation and
common sense. Devised by an experienced Air Force computer
technician, MSgt Joseph Licci, the Plan maximized advantages
the Center possessed prior to the eruption: an experienced
staff, a tested backup routine and alternate processing
sites capable of assuming Clark's processing requirements.
Although the Plan was technically and operationally
sound, it nearly ended in failure with the cancellation of
alternate site processing operations by a senior DPC
official
.
Communications deficiencies plagued the recovery effort.
Some were unavoidable, but problems could have been reduced.
Practice exercises using mobile satellite communications
vans to link with alternate sites would have f air.il iarized
DPC personnel with this critical procedure. Had they done
so, the automated data processing effort would have been
more productive.
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Disregarding the difficulties encountered, the DPC's
recovery from the "eruption of the century" was successful.
No lives were lost and the facility resumed a satisfactory
level of operations in a minimum amount of time. This
success was largely due to the professionalism and courage
of SSgt Reidy and the essential personnel left behind to
operate the Clark DPC. Adapting to uncertainty, danger and
extreme adversity, they preserved vital data files,
activated alternate site operations and resumed processing
in a most efficient manner.
If the Pinatubo disaster had happened elsewhere, the Air
Force perhaps would have begun shaping its long-range
recovery plans immediately, but Clark's future had been in
doubt for years by the time the volcano blew. Coming in the
middle of basing rights negotiations, the explosion only
hastened what may have been inevitable. (Grier, 1992,
p. 60)
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IV. HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE INCIDENT
A. OVERVIEW
This segment examines the contingency planning and
disaster recovery efforts of Homestead Air Force Base (AFB)
,
Florida and its data processing facility following a major
natural disaster.
Homestead AFB, an Air Force installation located ten
miles southwest of Miami, Florida bore the brunt of
Hurricane Andrew, a destructive storm that laid waste to
much of southern Florida and Louisiana in August 1992.
During this period, base and computer center contingency
plans were activated and used; these plans can therefore be
analyzed as to their usefulness in an actual disaster
setting.
Also studied are the szorm's effects on the surrounding
communities, local citizens, and commercial computer
information systems.
B. A HURRICANE IS BORN
Hurricane Andrew began on or about August 13, 1992 as a
patch of thunderstorms over western Africa, moving out over
the Atlantic Ocean as a rainy low-pressure wave. U. S.
National Hurricane Center satellites track 60 or 70 of these
waves each hurricane season (June through November) . This
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disturbance seemed unusually strong. By Monday, August 17,
it had intensified into a tropical storm, developing a
central circulation but not yet the clear "eye" that
characterizes a strong hurricane.
Then it encountered meteorologic problems. A well-
developed eye resembles a chimney. At its edges warm, moist
air near the ocean surface spirals up to altitudes where the
moisture condenses and releases its heat energy. But
high-level wind shear over the Atlantic tugged at Andrew's
central chimney and kept it from staying well aligned. Weak
and disorganized, Andrew began to veer north, toward the
open ocean. (Gore, 1993, p. 14)
Then, two days and a thousand miles off Florida- -the
wind shear diminished. Also, a high pressure zone to the
north grew stronger, pushing Andrew back westward. Still,
most of South Florida went to bed anticipating a relaxing
weekend.
Not Bryan Norcross, a TV weatherman at Miami's WTVJ who
had long been trying to warn his fellow Floridians to
prepare for "the big one" --the major hurricane that would
one day strike.
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"I didn't like the looks of this storm," recalls
Norcross. "I knew that soon someone within the sound of my
voice was going to have a hurricane- -and maybe a bad one."
(Gore, 1993, p. 14)
When Norcross returned to work Saturday, Andrew's winds
had reached hurricane strength- -74 miles an hour. Norcross
recalls thinking that day that it might not be so bad for
South Florida to have a hundred-mile-an-hcur storm to shake
resident's complacency about hurricane danger. But on
Sunday, as Andrew's winds grew to 150 miles an hour, he
realized that thousands of lives could be lost.
As Hurricane Andrew bore down and highways out of South
Florida clogged and shelters filled, countless viewers heard
Norcross' urgent warnings: "It's absolutely for sure. No
question about it. It's going to happen tonight." (Gore,
1993, p. 14)
1. A "Zone of Devastation"
Andrew transformed south Dade County, Florida- -home
to 350,000 people- -into a zone of devastation larger than
the city of Chicago. Virtually every building was ravaged;
80,000 dwellings were demolished or damaged too severely to
live in.
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Hurricane Andrew- -in its toll of destruction and
economic loss- -was the most devastating natural disaster
ever to strike the United States. In Florida it took a low
count of 43 lives, because residents heeded evacuation and
emergency warnings. It also destroyed perhaps 30 billion
dollars' worth of property. (Gore, 1993, p. 15)
National Hurricane Center (NHC) meteorologists
estimate sustained winds of 145 miles an hour with gusts of
175. They concede that winds may have approached 200 miles
an hour in places
.
It was clear in the Miami metropolitan area that a
hurricane had passed through. Traffic lights were out.
Trees were uprooted. The headquarters building of Burger
King, the fast-food giant, took a direct hit. Floor after
floor of windows had been blown out. Desks, computer
screens, and file cabinets were flipped over and smashed.
Ceilings and walls were ripped away, exposing ducts and
pipes. Some equipment was found two miles away. (Gore,
1993, p. 20)
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Looters helped themselves to resident's shattered
homes. Sporadic acts of violence erupted as homeowners
defended what few possessions they had left. Volunteer
worker Jo Ann McGinnis, a resident of Homestead, Florida,
described her community's ordeal:
...people were crazy, breaking into stores, stealing and
grabbing.... (Gore, 1993, p. 20)
Many people shared the nightmare of Andrew. Down
U. S. Highway 1 in Cutler Ridge, Florida (a community
southwest of Miami), security guard C. C. Jordan stands
alone on a jumble of concrete slabs. Before Andrew arrived
these slabs had formed the walls of a warehouse. "I'm lucky
to be alive," he says. Under one huge slab lies a crushed
truck. "I was sitting in that." (just before the warehouse
collapsed) (Gore, 1993, p. 23)
2. Effects on Commercial Information Systems
Thanks to timely and accurate weather forecasting,
many data center managers in the lower Southern states were
prepared for Hurricane Andrew. "Most of the customers we
were able to contact had backed up their data and were in
pretty good shape, but south Dade County, Homestead, those
areas- -you can forget it. The last thing they're thinking
about is their computer systems," said Carl McKinley,
director of customer service at Maynard Electronics, a
corporation that makes data backup systems. (Anthes, 1992,
p. 6)
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For more than one south Florida information systems
manager, the first days after the storm were spent making
sure employees still had homes to return to when the work
day was over. Lewis Temares, Chief Information Officer at
the University of Miami said, "I've got 12 people homeless
on my staff, and there are still 22 people I haven't even
heard from." (McPartlin, 1992, p. 12)
"This is the largest single disaster to affect
computer facilities," said Teri Schrieder, chief executive
officer at Contingency Planning Research, Inc., a disaster
recovery consulting firm based in Jericho, New York.
According to Schrieder, by the last week of August
1992, 39 major companies had moved to backup processing
sites provided by disaster recovery firms.
Some smaller firms did not arrange for a backup
processing site and considered themselves lucky they did not
need one. Jon Paul Olivier, director of computer operations
at Gulf South Engineers, Inc., in Houma, Louisiana said that
he wrapped his Digital Equipment Corporation Micro/VAX II
and his personal computers in plastic and moved them to
higher ground before the storm. (Anthes, 1992, p. 6)
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C. HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE DEVASTATED
1. In the Path of the Storm
After watching Hurricane Andrew grow and pick up
speed over four days, Air Force Colonel Steve Plummer,
commander of Homestead's 3 1st Fighter Wing, put the base's
disaster response plan into action early August 23, 1992.
"The plan is very specific on when we should
evacuate, " Plummer said. "When the storm reaches Category
III force (sustained wind velocity 111 to 130 m.p.h.), the
plan dictates that we will evacuate all personnel except
those I deem are absolutely essential. I ordered the
evacuation about 24 hours out. The people I selected to
remain behind were from the disciplines I thought I might
need immediately after the storm, like external power
production people, firefighters and security police."
Plummer and his team chose the base's alert facility
for shelter. The hardened building, which includes sleeping
quarters for aircrews and bays for alert aircraft, was the
structure most likely to escape damage. For more than five
hours, Plummer wondered whether he and his men would
survive. "There was nothing we could do but hope the
shelter we were in wouldn't come apart. It was a very
helpless feeling." (Gillert, 1992, p. 12)
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2 . Andrew' s Heroes
In the midst of Andrew's fury an Air Force
firefighter, SSgt Steve Wilensky volunteered to climb to the
top of the shelter and close a steel hatch on the roof. The
howling winds had blown the hatch open, creating a vacuum
that threatened to collapse the building. "We tethered him
to the ladder and held on to his legs, but he still could
have been seriously injured or killed, " Plummer said. "But
we had to get that door closed or the building would not
have made it." (Gillert, 1992, p. 12)
Wilensky said what he most remembers about the
hurricane were the feelings of complete isolation and the
noise. "By 3 (p.m. August 23) most of the people had gone
and we started securing the base," he said. "It started
getting dark about 8, and we tried to get some sleep. About
four o'clock (in the morning) we were woken up by the wind.
It was really starting to come at us. We started hearing
slamming and banging. Some of the (ground- level ) doors blew
open, and we tried to secure them. But they were off their
tracks and couldn't be closed."
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The wind sucked at some of the interior doors, and
the men struggled mightily to keep them closed. Wilensky
recounted: "The noise was terrible. It sounded like a
freight train, like kids jumping around on the roof. We saw
cars moved several feet by the wind." (Gillert, 1992,
p. 13)
The team received temporary respite when the
hurricane's eye passed through. For a while after the storm
resumed, the shelter was quiet. Then the roof started
giving in. Wilensky said he wasn't sure at that point that
they would make it out alive. But the storm finally passed,
and they escaped the refuge that threatened to become their
grave
.
After the hurricane wrecked Homestead Air Force Base
(AF3) on August 24, 1992, Colonel Plummer's first priority
was to make sure nobody was killed. Nobody was. The next
step: "to establish and maintain an environment where people
can work and live without fear of disease or injury,
"
Plummer said. (Gillert, 1992, p. 12)
3 . The Aftermath
"Homestead Air Force Base, home of Air Combat
Command's 31st Fighter Wing, no longer exists" was among the
first reports to air on television after the deadly storm
ripped through the base during the predawn hours of August
24, 1992.
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The storm, touted as the worst natural disaster in
U. S. history, hammered the base with winds approaching 200
miles an hour, leaving an unimaginable trail of devastation
and indefinitely shutting down base operations. (Haggerty,
1992, p. 2)
Most base facilities were damaged. The hurricane
tore roofing off all but a few of the 1,613 base houses.
Twc 31st Fighter Wing F-16s (fighter jets), which couldn't
be evacuated before the storm, were blown from their hangars
and dismantled by the winds.
Those who returned to the base were stunned by the
aftermath of the killer hurricane. "If we tried to bomb
this place, we couldn't have done it this well. It's total
and absolute devastation, " said Air Force MSgt Dennis Doome,
a member of a Reserve unit assigned to the base. (Haggerty,
1992, p. 5)
D. HOMESTEAD AFB COMPUTER CENTER- -EVACUATION
For Captain Chris Moore, Deputy Commander of the 31st
Communications Squadron and (now retired) MSgt Jim Knueppel,
Superintendent of Homestead's Base Communications and
Computer Center (BCCC) , the oncoming hurricane signaled the
beginning of a period of frenzied activity. When ordered by
his squadron commander, Moore, a seven-year Air Force
veteran activated the BCCC's Emergency Action Procedures
(EAP)
.
(Interview, Captain Moore, USAF, 1993)
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1. Emergency Action Procedures
Complying with Air Force 700 Series Regulations,
Homestead BCCC Emergency Action Procedures training had been
accomplished and documented on a quarterly basis. Prior to
Andrew's arrival, the EAP had been updated to reflect the
Regionalization of the facility.
The Regionalization concept (described at length in
a subsequent section) was the outcome of the U. S. Congress'
Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 924. As a
budgetary/management measure, DMRD 924 would consolidate
smaller, base- level data centers such as Homestead AFB with
larger computer facilities to form Regional Processing
Centers (RPC) . (Interview, LtCol Compton, USAF, 1993)
Under this concept, called Distributed
Communications Processing (DPC) , mainframe computers would
be concentrated in the RPC while functional user input
terminals and printers remained at the base. Under DMRD
924, sixty-six active Air Force bases are to be regionalized
to five geographically- located RPCs by mid- 1995.
Prior to Hurricane Andrew, most of the BCCC's
hardware, data bases and tape library had been moved to
Gunter AFB, Alabama, Homestead's designated RPC.
Communi cat ions and cryptologic equipment, consoles and user
terminals remained at Homestead. Connectivity between
Gunter and Homestead was established by means of the Air
Force Network (AFNET)
. (Interview, CMSgt Reed, 1993)
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The EAP was considerably updated; an unexpected by-
product of regionalization. The plan was reviewed and
modified, removing procedures pertaining to the missing
equipment and processing functions.
Risk assessments were conducted quarterly. After
the assessment was complete, the EAP was amended to reflect
new threats to the facility. Due to the air base's coastal
location and vulnerability to tropical storms, hurricanes
constituted a very real threat and represented a major
portion of BCCC contingency planning.
2 . Personnel Move to Safety
With the exception of MSgt Knueppel and two
unmarried airmen, Captain Moore relieved all other BCCC
personnel from duty and accompanied them to shelter.
Knueppel and the two airmen would remain to secure the
facility in accordance with the EAPs . (Interview, Captain
Moore, USAF. 199 3)
3 . Preparing for Andrew
Following EAP guidelines, MSgt Knueppel and his
small crew readied the BCCC for the onset of Hurricane
Andrew. When asked about specific actions that the crew
were to perform prior to a disaster, Moore stated that:
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Without the EAP's in front of me (all copies were
destroyed) , I cannot give you the exact order in which
they carried them out . Our primary concern was the
storing and securing of classified (materials) to
include classified messages, plans, documents and
manuals. (Interview, Captain Moore, USAF, 1993)
Once the BCCC's classified materials were secured,
the following procedures were accomplished:
• High-priced computer components were stored in Vidmar
(watertight) cabinets.
• All data equipment was powered lown (modems, modem nests
and the console that monitored the base Data Network)
.
• To protect against water damage, equipment was covered
with specially-made plastic covers.
• Squadron members made telephone contact with the BCCC,
stating their location and intentions. Evacuation and
safety procedures were emphasized. (Contact was made
with approximately 99% of squadron personnel)
BCCC communications and cryptologic equipment were
to remain energized regardless of the situation. It
remained so until emergency messages were sent to the Gunter
RPC and MacDill AFB (located in Tampa, Florida- -far from the
storm's center) advising them of the BCCC's situation and
intentions. Following that transmission, by order of the
squadron commander, all remaining equipment was deactivated.
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Disaster preparedness training conducted by the BCCC
paid big dividends in performance. As a result of their
quarterly EAP training, the three airmen:
...needed very little guidance on what to do. In fact,
not only did they send required (emergency) messages to
Gunter AFB, they also requested that Minimize conditions
be imposed for Homestead AFB. This action eliminated
higher headquarters from getting swamped with messages
destined for Homestead. (Interview, Captain Moore,
USAF, 1993)
When all the pre-disaster procedures were completed,
the crew secured the BCCC and moved to shelter. It would be
days until they could return. (Interview, Captain Moore,
USA?, 1993)
E . RECOVERY
In Andrew's wake, ordinary people did exceptional things
to bring aid to storm victims. At Homestead AFB, food,
toiletries, water and clothing arrived daily, donated by
communities around the United States and flown in by
military aircraft. The base wasn't established as a
distribution center, however, and pallets began piling up.
The solution: find a way to get the supplies to people in
need. After borrowing a few of the base's two-and-a-half
ton capacity trucks, a group of airmen began distributing
supplies to the hardest hit areas north of Homestead: Cutler
Ridge, Perrine, Goulds and Richmond Heights.
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"These people really need help, " an airman said. "This
is worse than what you see on the news. They need it all--
food, water, the works."
Over a span of several days, relief personnel managed,
with the help of off-duty volunteers from the base, to
deliver over 360,000 pounds of relief supplies.
An emergency response team also assisted people at
Homestead. Five days after the storm, the team helped the
returning population with personnel concerns, pay issues,
Air Force Aid Society assistance and claims processing.
(Haggerty, 1992, p. 6)
With nearly 25,000 troops working in the area, tent
cities went up all around Dade County. The Army's 82nd
Airborne Division from Fort Bragg found itself in a
different role: patrolling neighborhoods for looters,
serving hot meals, pulling wet carpets out of houses and
providing medical care for victims. "God sent us angels in
red berets," Andrea Martinez of Cutler Ridge said. "I feel
safer knowing they're here."
The runway at Homestead was busy. In one day, the base
received 105 flights and 700 tons of cargo. "Not only is
our airlift support of Hurricane Andrew the largest
operation Air Mobility Command has ever undertaken, it is
the biggest and fastest domestic relief operation effort
ever done by air in the history of the Air Force, " said
General Ronald R. Fogelman, commander-in-chief of the U. S.
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Transportation Command. Fogelman stated that the tons of
cargo moved by air into Florida over the first 10 days
following the storm nearly equaled the amount airlifted to
the Persian Gulf in the first ten days of Operation Desert
Shield. (Haggerty, 1992, p. 7)
1. Information Systems Aid Civilian Recovery Effort
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had
established a computer network spanning four disaster
assistance centers in south Florida. The network could
support up to 200 users and process requests for disaster
relief. The FEMA Network- -actually several local -area
networks connected by Tl (1.5 megabit per second capacity)
lines- -consisted of server computers, user terminals and a
fault-tolerant storage management system providing
continuous backup of data files.
The American Red Cross had also deployed a 12 -node
local area network and software developed to perform damage
assessment and account for Red Cross staff, supplies,
vehicles and expenses. The Red Cross and FEMA networks were




2 . Homestead BCCC Disaster Recovery
Despite extensive damage to the Homestead BCCC,
disaster recovery did not occur in the classic sense;
Homestead had migrated most of its computer operations to
the Gunter RPC months before the storm.
Via a dedicated communications link, Homestead's
data was backed up and stored at the Gunter RPC. Partial
file transfers were accomplished daily; complete backups
were performed and stored each week. As a result, no
Homestead BCCC data was lost as a result of the hurricane.
Regionalization of Homestead's computer facility had
eliminated most of the common disaster recovery steps:
up-to-date off- site storage of programs and data bases,
current alternate site support agreements and experienced
technicians deploying with portable sets of operating
instructions and data backups to alternate processing sites.
"Recovery, " therefore, was limited to reestablishing
data communications and input/output capability to the bases
where Homestead's functional users had dispersed.
(Interview, CMSgt Reed, USAF, 1993)
a. BCCC Personnel Reassigned
Andrew had destroyed the BCCC's ability to
function. Without a facility to operate from, most of
Homestead's functional users were reassigned to Gunter AFB,
MacDill AFB and Patrick AFB, Florida.
At MacDill and Patrick Air Force Bases, Homestead
personnel would restore only those processing functions not
yet performed by the Gunter RPC (Accounting/Finance and
Civilian Pay) . Connectivity was obtained with the Gunter
RPC via the Air Force Network (AFNET) , a 56 kilobits per
second (KBP3) data communications link.
On arrival at Gunter, users were assigned
passwords, user identification, terminals and data base
access privileges. Connectivity was established with other
facilities via the AFNET. Homestead data processors quickly
went back to work, quickly resuming normal processing
levels
.
3. Gunter AFB Regional Processing Center
The Gunter RPC, the first of five Regional
Processing Centers to be established throughout the United
States, played a major role in Homestead's recovery effort.
Located at the Gunter Annex, Maxwell AFB,
Montgomery, Alabama, the RPC provides standard base- level
computer (SBLC) data processing support to ten Air Force
bases and twelve Air National Guard bases located across the
United States' southern region.
The RPC uses both voice and data communications
systems, consisting of local and long-haul (AFNET) networks
to provide reliable, high-quality circuit connectivity to
its supported bases.
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Gunner RPC personnel operate ten UNISYS mainframe
computers, monitor the operation of robotic magnetic tape
silos, support over 200 databases, manage over 50,000
magnetic cartridge tapes and perform a host of other
processing tasks. The RPC is segmented into five functional
divisions, described as follows:
• Operations Division- -Provides 24 hour, 7 day a week
operational support to base- level centers. Equipped
with an array of UNISYS 2200 Series processors and a
robotic magnetic cartridge tape library system. Also
furnishes continuous Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN)
data message traffic support through the Host Autodin
Message Processing System. Division personnel perform
system recoveries during planned/unplanned system
outages
.
• Systems Management Division- -Supplies system monitors
who act as the primary focal point for base level
customers, ensuring prompt responsiveness to customer
needs. Each monitor supports three installations on a
full-time basis. Monitors verify receipt of input data
from ten Air Force and twelve Air National Guard bases
and load new software releases for assigned systems.
• Database Management Division- -Responsible for
configuration management of ten UNISYS mainframe
computers and eight magnetic tape silos. The Division
manages the largest distributed processor network in the
Air Force, providing data connectivity for over 20,000
RPC customers throughout the southeastern United States.
• Network Management Division- -Acts as the primary focal
point for communications -related issues for the RPC.
Network Management oversees the 56 KBPS high-speed data
network connecting the RPC to each supported base and
monitors RPC local area networks. Acts as configuration
manager for TELCON communications software; serves as
focal point for AFNET service requests.
• Plans and Requirements Division- -Responsible for
hardware management, fiscal year budgeting and customer
support. Accountable for over $16 million in equipment.
Gauges customer satisfaction by using telephone and
written surveys. (Interview, J. Buckner, 1993)
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The Gunter Regional Processing Center is capable of
accepting the computer operations of inoperative base -level
sites. Designed to 125% of normal data processing capacity,
the RPC has sufficient processing power to assume a
damaged/destroyed remote site's computerized tasking, as was
done with Homestead AFB. All future RPC's will eventually
possess this enhanced capability. (Interview, J. Buckner,
1993)
F . RELOCATION
When asked about the feasibility of rebuilding Homestead
AFE the commander of Air Combat Command, Air Force General
John M. Loh said that the first step will be to assess the
damage, estimated by the Pentagon to approach $480 million.
"Right now, we're making an assessment of what it would take
to rebuild Homestead. It will be costly and take a long
period of time," Loh stated. (Barela, 1993, p. 8)
After the hurricane, entire Homestead-based aircraft
squadrons and support units were reassigned to other duty
stations. By September 2, 1992 over two thousand officers
and airmen had been transferred.
The reassignments followed an announcement by
then- President Bush on 1 September that the federal




The Homestead BCCC still has not fully recovered from
Hurricane Andrew. In an interview with Captain Moore in
March 1993, Moore described the hurricane's effect on the
base as:
Unbelievable. As a Florida native, I had gone through
three storms, but I had never seen anything like it
(damage). Two-thirds of the BCCC's roof was gone.
Everything inside was wet, and there were several inches
of water under the raised floor in the equipment room.
Just incredible. (Interview, Captain Moore, USAF, 1993)
Moore, now commanding the 31st Communications Squadron,
stated that an Air Force mobile data processing center was
to relocate to Homestead after the storm, but was delayed
and eventually cancelled.
The BCCC and the mobile center were victims of several
overriding factors: the RPC's assumption of Homestead's
data processing requirements, the rapidly diminishing number
of Homestead-based personnel and uncertainty clouding the
base's future.
G. ADVANTAGES /LESSONS LEARNED
From Homestead AFB's experiences, DOD Information
managers can obtain useful information that should prove
useful in their contingency planning efforts.
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Advantages, lessons learned and recommendations are listed
below:
• The presence and cooperation of the Gunter-based cadre
of experts who promptly absorbed Homestead's users into
their organization, opened communications with remote
sites and rearranged RPC processor tasking to perform
Homestead's critical tasks with a minimum of delay.
• The Gunter RPC was specifically designed with excess
capacity to assume the workload of a damaged/destroyed
facility. This capability was a key factor in the
efficient resumption of Homestead data processing
operations
.
• MacDill and Patrick AFB's cooperation in assuming
Homestead's data processing functions that were not yet
being performed by the RPC. For example, Homestead
Accounting/Finance functional users migrated to MacDill,
set up operations and quickly resumed work.
• The Regionalization concept, in conjunction with the
automated file transfer routine instituted by the Gunter
RPC, permitted the efficient resumption of Homestead's
critical processing functions. Had Homestead not
transferred the bulk of its hardware and data files to
Gunter prior to the hurricane, all the classic disaster
recovery steps- -with associated delays- -would have been
present
.
• Disaster preparedness training pays off. The three
airmen that secured the BCCC knew their responsibilities
and carried them out without hesitation. This
noteworthy performance under stressful conditions came
from confidence gained in rehearsals under realistic
practice conditions.
• Avoiding bureaucratic "snarls," communications circuits
were quickly restored and hastened resumption of
Homestead's critical data processing functions-
-
primarily Accounting/Finance operations from MacDill
AFB.
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Captain Moore recommends that, with regionalization
taking place throughout the Air Force, "quick
disconnects" should be mounted on the smaller, more
portable data equipment found in base- level centers. In
a minimum of time, equipment could be disconnected,
loaded in trucks and evacuated. He further recommends
that each user be trained in detaching several pieces of
dissimilar equipment for removal in emergencies.
H. DISADVANTAGES
Homestead BCCC's existing Emergency Action Procedures
proved to be effective during Hurricane Andrew. No lives
were lost, Homestead data was saved and processing resumed.
However, there were several disadvantages noted and adverse
lessons learned by the Air Force and Department of Defense
(DOD) personnel who participated in the BCCC recovery
effort. They are:
• The plastic covers that shielded the BCCC's computers
and other equipment retained moisture to such an extent
that extensive corrosion developed within the covered
equipment. Due to the destroyed roof and damage to the
BCCC's environmental control units (air- conditioners and
humidifiers) there was no way to adequately dry out the
facility. Trapped moisture possibly caused as much
damage as rain would have on uncovered equipment
.
• Captain Moore stated that the EAPs should have been
activated two days in advance of the hurricane, to
include the total evacuation of personnel. However,
Moore added that, due to Andrew's total devastation of
the base, leaving a week earlier would have made little
difference. In this instance, the EAPs saved lives but
were unable to save the data facility.
• The loss of an RPC with all of its centralized
processing capability would be a crippling blow to the
base-level centers. RPCs will ultimately act as each
other's alternate sites, but until they are completed




Gore wrote of but one advantage to come from the
devastation caused by Hurricane Andrew. An excerpt from his
magazine article is transcribed below:
Andrew has had this positive impact: it has brought
South Florida's residents- -a diverse, often bizarre and
troublesome lot- -closer together. "Homestead (Florida) was
blown into the 21st century, " says city parks director Paul
Burleson. "We'll be the newest city in the country." But
beneath the courageous statements lurks a deeper feeling,
one that was scrawled across the only remaining wall of a
crumbled home. It says, "Damn you, Andrew." (Gore, 1993,
p. 37)
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V. DFAS/DITSO KANSAS CITY ORGANIZATION AND BACKGROUND
A. ORGANIZATION
The U. S. Marine Corps Finance Center, and the computer
center that supports the Finance Center's activities, is
located in Kansas City, Missouri. As part of a
Congressionally-mandated consolidation scheme, the financial
portion of the organization was recently reorganized and
renamed, and is now part of the Defense Finance Accounting
Service, or DFAS . The computer center also was reorganized,
and was integrated into the Defense Information Technology
Service Organization, or DITSO. These organizations will be
referred to as DFAS-KC and DITSO- KC.
1. Command Structures
Although they occupy the same building, DFAS-KC and
DITSO-KC are separate organizations. Each has its own chain
of command and reporting responsibilities. Each has a
director with subordinate department and division heads
reporting to them. The DFAS-KC table of organization in
Figure 1 contains directorates for each financial activity,
such as the Directorate for Vendor Payments, Directorate for
Military Pay and many others. DITSO-KC organizational






















































































Figure 2. DITSO-KC Organization
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Subordinate Divisions and Branches, headed by
Government Service (GS) rated civilians and U. S. Marine
Corps personnel, represent data processing, administrative
and support functions that make up DITSO-KC.
B. DFAS BACKGROUND
U. S. Marine Corps active-duty, retired and reserve
pay- related activities are the primary functions of DFAS-KC.
The accounting and administration of individual Marine pay
accounts has made great strides since the era of manually-
computed pay records maintained at the small unit level.
Marine payrolls have evolved into computerized, fully-
automated records. Over one hundred thousand Marines
stationed around the world are served from one centralized
location. Periodically, units electronically transmit
individual pay- related data (promotions, demotions and other
adjustments to basic pay and allowances) to Kansas City for
inclusion into individual computer files maintained on
mainframe computer accounts. These mainframe accounts are
capable of storing hundreds of gigabytes of information.
After receipt of such data, computers make required
adjustments to specified accounts, store this data for
DFAS-KC use, and generate a personalized record of pay and




Printed and mailed monthly, this record is called the
Leave and Earnings Statement (LES) . It is a one or two page
form containing each Marine's basic pay, allowances, tax
data, allotments, leave accrual and balance, and other
information.
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VI. DFAS/DITSO KANSAS CITY PLANNING MODEL
A. OUTLINE
Disaster recovery (or contingency) plans can be divided
into four distinct phases: planning, preparation,
implementation, and recovery. (Hural, 1992, p. 5)
Using a generic contingency plan outline (Appendix) as a
tool, Kansas City's plan will be partitioned into these four
phases for purposes of analysis and discussion. The outline
contains relevant planning categories needed to examine a
contingency document and will be used to analyze the
DFAS/DITSO-KC plan. (Hural, 1992, p. 15)
This phased plan outline can also serve as a reference
when designing a DOD disaster recovery plan. Each phase
contains unique design criteria that could assist




The planning phase of a disaster recovery plan is
...used to develop the plans, programs, policies, and
procedures to be put into operation to reduce the effect
of a natural disaster on an organization's information
system. (Hural, 1992, p. 5)
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1. Preliminary Planning
Soon after the DFAS/DITSO reorganization, perhaps
motivated by the damage caused by Hurricane Andrew, DFAS and
DITSO headquarters officials called for completion of
contingency planning documents by all activities, and to
provide reports by 31 December 1992. (DFAS Memorandum,
1992)
During October and November 1992, three Contingency
Planning Working Group (CPWG) meetings involving DFAS/DITSO
management and planning personnel from each member facility
were held to discuss the state of DFAS/DITSO installation
contingency plans.
Key issues discussed were:
• The need to develop detailed plans on
relationships/interfaces between the two organizations
related to contingency planning and programs.
• DFAS and DITSO to develop an Interservice Support
Agreement (ISA) to facilitate planning.
• Formulation of a Concept of Operations for Contingency
Planning to identify priorities, functions, support and
technical requirements.
• DFAS requirement to provide a "strawman" concept plan as
the first step in combined planning.
• Lessons learned from natural disasters.
• Plan status.
• Delay in DITSO headquarters -level planning, waiting on
completion of studies by an independent contractor.
• Eventual migration to Regional Processing Centers (RPC)
and its effect on individual center's contingency
planning. (DFAS Memorandum, 1992)
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Plan status was discussed at length with Center
planning representatives describing actions they were taking
to improve and update existing plans. Several DFAS offices
reported that a specialized software package designed for
preparing contingency plans, DP9 0PLUS by Sungard Planning
Solution Inc., had been purchased and loaded into PCs for
use. During the 30 November 1992 CPWG meeting, a top DFAS
executive expressed concern that Kansas City was not
"placing sufficient resources and emphasis on contingency
planning, " even though this planning will "only be for
several years until consolidation (of satellite centers) is
complete .
"
The Kansas City representative reported that their
existing plan, in use since 1987, had been reviewed and that
the revision process had begun. DFAS-KC had also
established a Crisis Coordination Center (CCC) , to serve as
a base of operations for the management of the recovery
effort, and had started working with the DITSO-KC office.
The DFAS-KC contingency plan was estimated to be complete by
15 April 1993. The DFAS-KC representative also stated that
offices were being reorganized, additional people were being
hired to assist with administrative details, and that
contingency planning should receive more attention in the
future. (DFAS Memorandum, 19 92)
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2 . Plan Development
After a hesitant beginning, the effort to replace
DFAS/DITSO-KC s current contingency plan, originally drafted
in September 1987, was underway. In late 1992, two
principal planners, one from DFAS-KC and one from the DITSO-
KC organization, were assigned to rewrite and update the
plan.
Faced with a 15 April 1993 plan completion deadline,
principal planners began to revise their outdated plan.
Several planning factors that they encountered are listed
below:
a. Separate Plans
Although DFAS-KC and DITSO-KC occupied the same
facility and operated jointly in administering Marine Corps
payrolls, principal planners were initially required to
produce separate contingency plans for each organization.
While a single, integrated plan would appear to
be more cost effective and easier to implement, the fact
that these two organizations reported to different command
structures, each with their own requirements, made separate
plans unavoidable. However, the DITSO-KC principal planner
attended many planning sessions and worked closely with his
DFAS-KC counterpart.
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Unfortunately, early in the project, the DITSO-KC
planner was transferred to an extended period of additional
duty unrelated to DFAS/DITSO-KC contingency planning. Faced
with the loss of most of their corporate planning knowledge,
DITSO-KC joined with DFAS-KC in the preparation of a single,
integrated plan.
b. DITSO Data Processing Support
In an 18 December 1992 memorandum concerning Pay
System Backup and Recovery Plans, the DITSO-KC director
listed the following data processing support to be provided
DFAS-KC while planning for contingencies:
• Regular backup of critical DFAS files and off -site
storage
.
• Use of DITSO-KC s designated contingency backup
processing "hot" site. However, DITSO-KC had not tested
their Transportable Contingency Action Plan (TCAP)
,
(a
contingency plan that covers DITSO-KC s relocation to
alternate processing sites) and could not forecast an
approximate length of time before processing operations
could be resumed from the "hot" site.
• Pay check generation for all Marine Corps military and
civilian personnel. This process, to be accomplished
within hours after relocation, would pay personnel based
on amounts received during the last pay period. (DFAS
Memorandum, 1992)
c. DP90PLUS
Sungard's DP90PLUS contingency planning software
was mandated for purchase by DFAS-HQ for member facilities
to use in preparing their plans. DP90PLUS, a PC-based,
business recovery planning product was used by DFAS-KC to
automate their contingency plan development process.
75
DFAS-KC administrative personnel that used
DP90PLUS initially encountered a very steep "learning curve"
as the software is definitely not user friendly.
Frustration mounted and requirements piled up as users
struggled to learn DP90PLUS.
3. Critical/Vital Functions
The DITSO-KC Director had requested that processing
functions be prioritized, and called for DFAS/DITSO-KC
offices to identify "critical" and "vital/essential"
functions and resources they would need to fulfill their
mission should a disaster occur. The plan defines critical
functions as:
...functions which, if not performed due to a disaster,
would cause serious or irreparable harm to DFAS- Kansas
City Center in terms of lost revenue and profits,
increased operating costs, loss of customers and market
share. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 195)
In the context of conventional data processing,
Toigo defines critical and vital functions as:
These functions cannot be performed unless identical
capabilities are found to replace the company's damaged
capabilities. Critical applications cannot be replaced
by manual methods under any circumstances. Tolerance to
interruption is very low, the cost of interruption very
high. (Toigo, 1989, p. 35)
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Vital functions are:
Functions that cannot be performed by manual means or
can be performed manually for only a very brief period
of time. In applications classified as vital, a brief
suspension of processing can be tolerated, but a
considerable amount of "catching up" will be needed to
restore data to a current or usable form. (Toigo, 1989,
p. 35)
Questionnaires were prepared and distributed among
DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel as a means of identifying "critical"
and "vital/essential" data processing functions. These
personnel were also asked to: (1) prioritize each function
as to its impact on Center operations, should a disaster-
related interruption occur; (2) specify the order in which
each function should be restored; and (3) estimate an
acceptable delay period before resumption of processing.
Examples of DFAS/DITSO-KC critical processing
functions are: Budgeting, Vendor Payment, Financial Liaison
and Lost/Damaged Records Restoration.
Each critical function, in order of priority, is
listed and described in the plan's Critical Function Report.
Members of DFAS/DITSO-KC disaster recovery teams, assigned
by name to each function, are responsible for the damage
assessment, current status, and restoration of their
assigned function following a disaster.
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4. Plan Analysis
Despite difficulties, the DFAS-KC principal planner
began revising the old plan, meeting the 28 February 1993
draft submission deadline to DFAS-HQ.
The final draft submitted to DFAS-HQ was the subject
of analysis in this thesis.
C. PREPARATION PHASE
This phase pertains to policies and procedures to be
utilized in a non-emergency environment in preparation for a
forecasted disaster. It also includes normal everyday
procedures used to lessen the impact of an unforecasted
disaster.
1. Purpose
The DFAS-KC Disaster Recovery Plan is designed to:
• Increase the probability of the survival of DFAS-KC
Center as a business entity in the event a disaster
disables the DFAS-KC facility.
• Reduce the exposure of DFAS-KC Center to financial loss
as a result of the disaster. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 2)
The purpose of the Disaster Recovery Plan is to
document recovery strategies, essential resources, plans and
procedures necessary to meet the above objectives. This
planning will:
a. Shorten elapsed time to effect a recovery.
b. Minimize costs to effect a recovery.
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c. Avoid confusion and reduce exposure to error in the
recovery process.
d. Avoid duplicated effort by recovery personnel.
(DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 7)
2 . Scope
The Disaster Recovery Plan is designed to create a
state of readiness that will provide an immediate response
to a disaster occurrence at 1500 E. Bannister Road
(DFAS/DITSO-KC Center)
.
The plan addresses the scope of a disaster as a
worst case scenario involving loss of the facility or loss
of access to the facility, and is adaptable to lesser
disasters such as loss of a single working area or piece of
equipment
.
Disasters are classified as:
• Minor - -one in which the computer outage is anticipated
to be about one day (i.e., in excess of one shift, but
not longer than two days) . Damage due to a minor
disaster is not extensive. It may consist of minor
damage to hardware, software, or electrical equipment
from fire, water, chemicals, etc.
• Major - -one in which the computer outage is anticipated
to be from two to seven days. Damage due to a major
disaster is more severe than that due to a minor
disaster. For example: in the case of a major
disaster, several disk drives could be permanently
destroyed or severely damaged, or the computer room
could suffer heavy damage but the computers (as re-
configured) could be operational within the week.
79
• Catastrophic - -one in which the computer outage is
anticipated to be in excess of seven days. Damage due
to a catastrophic disaster is severe and could involve
total destruction of the Computer Center, making major
replacement of equipment or significant renovation of
the facility necessary. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 196)
3. Objectives
Plan objectives are as follows:
a. The overall recovery objective- -restore critical
functions within 24-48 hours of a disaster occurrence to
1500 E. Bannister Road. The Critical Functions Report
contains a detailed list of essential functions.
b. Reestablish critical production processing within two
business days.
c. Restore data to within one operating day of
interruption, using backup tapes stored off -site. (DFAS-
KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 7)
4 . Assumptions
The plan was based on the following assumptions:
a. Only the 1500 E. Eannister Road facility is disabled
by the disruption; the backup sites are not affected.
b. The off-site storage location, where critical backup
files and information are stored, is intact and
accessible.
c. A full complement of qualified and trained disaster
recovery personnel are available to carry out
responsibilities. The recovery tasks are detailed enough
for either the alternate or, if need be, back-up site
personnel to effect the recovery.
d. Recovery is performed in accordance with procedures
set forth in documentation.
e. Data backup and rotation procedures have been
approved by management and are in place. Essential data
has been identified, backed up and rotated off -site on a
regular basis.
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f. A telecommunications backup strategy has been
approved by management; it has been successfully tested
and is currently in place.
g. Plan review, maintenance and updates are scheduled on
a regular basis to ensure that the plan remains ready and
viable
.
h. An ongoing plan awareness and training program is in
place.
i. Testing of the plan is performed throughout the year.
(DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 7)
5. Facility Layout
DFAS/DITSO-KC operates from a sprawling, three
hundred yard square, brick and concrete building. Built by
the WPA in 1942, the giant structure was originally
constructed for the Pratt and Whitney Aircraft Corporation
to house its aircraft engine manufacturing operation. At
that time, it was the largest building in the world under
one roof
.
a. Facility Safety/Security Measures
Although the building is over 50 years old, up-
to-date safety features have been installed. An overhead
water sprinkling system, conforming to local/governmental
fire department regulations, protects the building's
occupants and contents from fire. Heat -activated
sprinklers, located throughout the building's five levels,
are designed so that one sprinkler head may activate to
extinguish a fire without causing a chain reaction from
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other sprinkler heads, thus avoiding water damage to
unaffected areas.
Security is enhanced by an advanced electronic
alarm system and roving security patrols. In addition,
security personnel occupy control stations located




To assist in the recovery process following a
disaster, a comprehensive list of an organization's assets
by department, application, and service must be compiled.
The physical inventory encompasses more than a list of
hardware. In essence, everything must be inventoried.
Items to be included in the physical inventory are:
• Internal telecommunications equipment
• Media
• Data communications
• Wiring systems and diagrams
• Vital records and documentation
• Physical environment of the facility (Hural, 1992, p. 9)
A vital segment of DFAS/DITSO-KC Center's inventory,
the list of backup tapes stored off-site, is maintained by
the Tape Library Team. Backup tape inventory lists are
located at DFAS/DITSO-KC and at the off-site storage
location.
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Within each section or department, selected
personnel termed "Responsible Officers" (RO) , maintain
detailed records that catalog and describe the equipment,
machine serial numbers, wiring diagrams, users manuals and
other documentation held by their workcenters
.
7 . Risk Assessment
According to Toigo, risk assessment/analysis is:
. . .a big term for what is essentially a straightforward
application of good research and common sense. (Toigo,
1989, p. 32)
The three basic objectives of risk assessment are:
1. Identifying company assets and functions necessary
for business resumption following a disaster, and
prioritizing them according to time sensitivity and
criticality
.
2. Identifying existing threats to assets and functions.
3. Setting objectives for developing strategies to
eliminate avoidable risks and minimize the impact of
risks that cannot be eliminated. (Toigo, 1989, p. 32)
Risk assessment, or analysis, is the identification
of risks/risk exposure, and consists of two basic
operations: data collection and analysis.
a. Data Collection and Analysis
Data collection should include comprehensive
lists of computer and telecommunications hardware, and a
complete inventory of applications and systems software.
From this collection, system configuration diagrams can be
created and annotated to show the amount of activity,
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traffic, or use of each system in a typical business day,
week, or month to identify critical business functions.
Organizations should then research the impact
that an interruption of these critical functions would have
on their productivity, and take necessary precautions to
protect them. (Toigo, 1989, p. 32)
b. DFAS/DITSO-KC Risk Assessment
A preliminary risk assessment similar to the
above guidelines was accomplished by the DITSO-KC Security
Department and the DITSO-KC principal planner, and
identified power and hardware losses as primary risk
factors. Natural disasters such as fire and flood were
listed as "marginal" threats.
To determine tangible risks and threats to the
facility and its operations, the DFAS-KC planner prepared
questionnaires to be completed by selected employees in each
department. The information received enabled the DFAS-KC
planner to become more aware of an actual user's evaluation
of risks present in the workplace.
Although the plan does not address methods to
counter specific threats, information gained from DFAS-KC
questionnaires was valuable; several potential threats to




An interview with the DFAS/DITSO-KC facility
plant manager provided information on environmental hazards
that may affect DFAS/DITSO-KC. Of the various hazards
discussed, floods pose the greatest danger to the Center.
Seasonal heavy rainfall regularly saturates low- lying areas,
or flood plains, that surround the DFAS/DITSO-KC facility.
In 1962, flood waters saturated lower levels of the
building, causing extensive damage.
In addition to the threat posed by flood waters,
a nearby electronics plant could accidentally spill
hazardous liquids used in their manufacturing process.
These liquids could jeopardize the Center and its personnel.
The data processing center, located above ground
on the "mezzanine" level, is not considered to be at risk
from flood waters. However, water incursion within the
facility could disrupt operations to the extent that
alternative processing sites would have to be used.
The flood threat is being countered by the
construction of a 15- foot high, $13 million dollar flood
wall. Scheduled for completion in October 1993, the wall is
expected to drastically reduce the potential flooding
problem.
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Tornadoes, a trademark of the Midwest, also
threaten the building and its occupants. The facility is
used as a tornado shelter by Civil Defense authorities with
adequate protection for hundreds of personnel on the Sub-
Basement level. Though the building is considered sturdy
enough to withstand a tornado, data processing operations
could be disrupted by storm damage to the local community.
(DFAS/DITSO-KC Facility Manager Interview, 1992)
8. Backup Operations
Backup of DFAS/DITSO data is accomplished on a daily
and bi-weekly basis. Irreplaceable data stored on the
mainframe computer (pay accounts, unit diary information and
personnel data files) is backed up daily. Also on a daily
basis, local area network (LAN) data, consisting of personal
computer (PC) data files, is backed up and stored at LAN
server computers.
On a bi-weekly basis, the entire contents of the
mainframe computer is copied to magnetic tape, sealed and
moved to off -site storage. (DFAS/DITSO-KC Planners
Interview, 1992)
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9. Off Site Storage
DFAS/DITSO-KC off -site storage is performed by a
company specializing in magnetic tape storage and
maintenance. Located in an refurbished former salt mine
beneath suburban Kansas City, the company stores Center
backup tapes until needed for use in recovery operations.
Off -site storage reference material/tape inventory
data sheets, called Vault Listings, contain inventory lists
of backup tapes stored off -site. These listings are kept at
DFAS/DITSO-KC and at the off-site storage location for
reference, when needed.
Vendor information (name, phone number, and
descriptions of equipment and supplies provided) is also
listed on the storage reference material/tape inventory data
sheets.
Selected DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel have been
authorized to travel to the off-site storage location to
retrieve backup magnetic tapes, and prepare them for
shipment to alternate processing sites.
For security, only one version of backup tapes is to
be retrieved from off -site. Other versions are to remain
off -site should transported tapes become lost or damaged in
transit. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 532)
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10. Alternate Site Processing
Should a disaster render the DFAS-KC Center unusable
for operations, the plan calls for migration to selected
primary and alternate "cold" or "hot" sites.
"Cold sites" are shell facilities lacking pre-
positioned computers, peripherals, or supplies, whereas "hot
sites" are fully functioning, operational computer centers
that have the capability to perform additional data
processing requirements for the period of time that the
stricken facility is unusable. (DFAS/DITSO-KC Planners
Interview, 1992)
11. Recovery Team Personnel and Training
Responding to a directive from the Management Team,
Recovery Teams, composed of DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel, have
been formed to restore data processing operations at the
host facility or alternate sites.
a. Recovery Team Scenarios
As described in the plan, there are two recovery
team scenarios:
1. The Center is only slightly damaged, and capable of
supporting data processing operations. The plan calls
for recovery team mobilization and deployment within four
hours after the disaster, with restoration of the
mainframe system and backup networks accomplished within
16 hours.
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2. The Center is determined to be unusable. Recovery-
teams are to install PCs, peripherals, telecommunications
and other required equipment at the selected "cold sites"
within 24 hours following the disaster. (DFAS-KC Draft
Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 196-197)
Several Recovery Teams and their duties include:
• Recovery Management Team- -Composed of the directors of
all the major divisions within DFAS/DITSO-KC, this team
reviews initial damage reports and assessments. It
estimates delays in operations and determines whether or
not the disaster recovery plan should be activated. The
Management Team coordinates all Center recovery-
activities .
• Facility Recovery Team- -Assesses physical plant damage,
minimizes further losses and salvages recoverable
resources. Responsible for preparation, maintenance,
and repair of backup processing facilities.
• Operations Team- -Supervises alternate site computer
processing activities, restores operating system
software, enforces alternate processing data backup
procedures, and establishes processing schedules.
• Tape Library Team- -Retrieves backup data from off -site
storage, performs inventory of retrieved materials,
prepares tapes for shipment to the alternate processing
site, and organizes the alternate site's tape library.
• Telecommunications Team- -Directs voice network and
telecommunications recovery activities, prepares
alternate site telecommunications systems, makes
required network patches, and repairs damaged
communications equipment and facilities. (DFAS-KC Draft
Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 210)
12. Hardware and System Software
Hardware and software requirements at alternate
processing sites are addressed within the plan. Listed
below are hardware and software requirements for the DFAS-KC
alternate processing, or "cold" site:
• FAX Machine
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• A-B Switch, 3 each
• Laser Printer, 3 each
• Personal computers (PC), 486, 100 MB hard drives, 6 each
• Calculators, 6 each
• CXI Boards, 6 each
• LOTUS 1-2-3, version 2.4, 4 each
• Enable, version 3.0, 4 each (DFAS Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 69)
DITSO-KC's alternate processing ("hot" site), at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina will supply operational
mainframe computers and systems software. Also available
for use by DITSO-KC personnel are a number of PCs with
installed applications software and peripheral devices.
(Interview, MSgt Spaulding, USMC, 1993)
13 . Communications
The plan lists data and voice communications
strategies necessary to reestablish communications between
DFAS-KC and DITSO-KC alternate processing sites. These
strategies are:
• Data- -In the event that a disaster is experienced at the
DFAS/DITSO-KC, a major concern would be connectivity
between the computers and operating departments located
at alternate or backup facilities. DFAS-KC will use
dial-up connections between locations to provide this
connectivity.
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• Voice- -Voice communications are in place at the DFAS
alternate processing site. Adequate voice
communications facilities is a criteria for selecting
the alternate facilities for the operating departments.
The alternate communications numbers will be determined
at time of disaster. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 172)
Telecommunications equipment, to be installed and
maintained at the DFAS-KC alternate site, is listed within
the plan.
14. Supplies
Vendors and the supplies they provide are identified





• Travel Vouchers and Claims for Reimbursement
• Pay and Leave documents
• Users and procedural manuals
• Floppy diskettes and calculator tape (DFAS-KC Draft
Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 70)
15. Transportation
The Facility Recovery Team Manager, assisted by the
Support Operation Division and the Transportation Team, is
responsible for the coordination and movement of personnel,
equipment, and materials to DFAS-KC and DITSO-KC alternate
processing sites.
91
Available methods of transportation include a
combination of government and commercial automobiles, trucks
and buses. Government air transportation, if available, is
to be used for movement of personnel and supplies to distant
alternate processing sites.
Personnel required to travel during the recovery
operation will complete Travel Accommodations Request Forms
for payment of travel and lodging expenses.
16. Power and Equipment
In an emergency, a doubly- redundant Uninterruptable
Power Supply (UPS) will provide electrical power to the
DFAS/DITSO-KC Center. Should the primary commercial
electricity source be disrupted, generators located at the
facility will activate, providing a near- instantaneous
resumption of power.
Should the generators malfunction, a supply of
lead- cell batteries, sensing a second disruption, assume the
electrical requirements (load) . For a limited period of
time, this second, on-site backup system would provide
sufficient electrical power for users to save/backup work
currently in progress, minimizing data losses.
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17 . Documentation
In order to efficiently conduct operations from
alternate processing sites, a number of documents are made
available to DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel.
These documents, and multiple copies of the disaster
recovery plan, are to be maintained at the DFAS/DITSO-KC
Center for use in pre-disaster training and orientation
sessions. Additional documents and copies of the disaster
recovery plan will be held at the off-site storage facility,
to be recovered for use as reference materials during the
recovery phase.
Some of the required documents and their uses are
listed below:
• Users Manuals- -Copies of hardware and software user
documentation are stored on and off -site. These
reference/instructional documents will accompany
DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel to alternate processing sites.
• Wiring Diagrams- -Local area network wiring diagrams,
maintained by Responsible Officers and network
maintenance personnel within DFAS/DITSO-KC, will be used
to reconstruct damaged or destroyed LANs at the Center.
• Damage Assessment Reports- -This document describes the
disaster's effect on data, hardware, software and the
facility. The report also contains a section in which
damage assessment personnel log their estimates on the
length of time before production can be resumed.
Management will use recovery time estimates in reports
to higher authority.
• Unit Cost and Pay Manuals- -These manuals contain
procedures for payment of active-duty, reserve and
retired Marines as well as payments to civilian
employees. The manuals also cover regulations for
payment of vendors should services/supplies be required
in an emergency situation.
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• Personnel Rosters- -Used for notification of DFAS/DITSO-
KC personnel during the disaster. These rosters are
made up of names, addresses and telephone numbers of
DFAS/DITSO-KC management, personnel and recovery teams.
Also listed are mailing addresses, facsimile numbers and
electronic mail addresses of vendors, alternate
processing sites and Points of Contact. (DFAS Draft
Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 70)
18. Plan Maintenance
Detailed maintenance procedures within the
DFAS/DITSO-KC disaster recovery plan call for periodic
reviews and revisions to reflect changes in plans and
policies, as well as recovery team personnel turnover.
Changes are to be submitted in writing to the Recovery
Coordinator for review.
The DFAS/DITSO-KC philosophy on disaster recovery
plan maintenance is as follows:
...a disaster recovery plan is only as valid as the
information it contains. To ensure that the plan is
used effectively in an emergency it must be accurate,
timely, and complete. It is imperative, therefore, that
the plan be reviewed often and updated as necessary.
(DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 70)
The plan is scheduled for annual review during
January with periodic section reviews to be conducted
throughout the calendar year.
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19. Plan Testing
Disaster recovery plans, though constructed with
painstaking detail over hundreds of man-hours, are virtually-
useless if not tested. Toigo states:
Disaster recovery plans should not be tested in use.
That is, a disaster should not have to occur before
erroneous conclusions and errant strategies are
revealed. (Toigo, 1989, p. 217)
If a disaster occurs before the plan is tested under
practice conditions, the plan may fail miserably in
execution becoming a disaster in and of itself.
Disaster planning experts, including those who owe
their expertise to having recovered from "smoke and
rubble -type" disasters, argue that testing is the most
important element of disaster recovery planning.
Organizations that had not tested their contingency
plans prior to a disaster encountered problems. For
example, a Canadian firm, after experiencing a fire that
demolished company headquarters, packaged over 10,000 reels
of tape containing payroll systems and data and formed a
caravan headed for a "hot site" located in New Jersey.
At the border they were prevented from entering the
U. S. by customs agents, who were concerned that the
software and checks could be used for illegal purposes. It
took the intervention of the company CEO, in conjunction
with the U. S. consulate, to straighten out the matter.
(Toigo, 1989, p. 202)
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a. DFAS/DITSO-KC Plan Testing
DFAS/DITSO-KC has prepared four practice tests
which scrutinize different portions of the disaster recovery
plan. Tests are divided into three levels, arranged in
order of personnel/resources required to execute the test.
Each test will be closely monitored by a team of
DFAS/DITSO-KC evaluators . Extensive debriefs of test
participants, stressing lessons learned during the testing
evolution, are scheduled to follow each exercise.
Test levels, objectives and procedures are listed in the
following paragraphs:
Test 1, Level 2 Objectives- -Test 1 determines:
• The adequacy of off-site storage, file availability and
documentation needed for recovery.
• The completeness of Disaster Alert, Assessment,
Verification and Personnel Notification procedures.
• The aggregate number of Recovery Team personnel who are
available under no-notice, practice conditions, and the
accuracy of telephone rosters.
Procedures- -After notification of a practice
disaster scenario restricting access to office files and
documentation, Recovery Management Team members move to the
CCC. Once there, they execute disaster assessment and
evaluation procedures and determine the level of disaster
plan activation. Recovery Team members, contacted at home,
refer to their personal copies of the disaster plan and
comply with individual/team recovery procedures.
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Test 2, Level 1 Objectives- -This test examines:
• Systems restoration using in- house systems, personnel
and off-site files/documentation.
• The availability/applicability of critical resources to
be used at alternate processing sites.
Procedures- -Alerted in advance, a minimum number
of Recovery Team members, responsible for critical function
restoration, travel to the alternate processing site. While
at the alternate site, critical functions are restored and
resources checked against the Critical Resources Report to
ensure adequate supplies are available to perform the test
function.
Test 3, Level 1 Objectives- -Conducted annually,
this test evaluates DITSO-KC off -site backup procedures.
Procedures- -Accompanied by an evaluator from the
Recovery Management Team, DITSO-KC recovery team members
travel to the off-site storage facility to check the
material condition and availability of systems restoration
backup tapes
.
Test 4, Level 3 Objectives- -The Test 4 scenario
denies access to DFAS/DITSO-KC Center. Conducted annually,
the test checks:
• Operation of the telecommunication network between DFAS-
KC and DITSO-KC alternate processing sites.
• Restoration of critical functions, using only backup
data.
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Procedures- -Test 4 requires the participation of
DFAS-KC's Finance and End User Interface Teams and DITSO-KC
Recovery Team members. The Finance Team travels to the
DFAS-KC alternate processing site, while the End User
Interface Team and DITSO-KC Recovery Team personnel relocate
to DITSO-KC s "hot" site, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.
DFAS/DITSO-KC evaluators will be present at both
locations. During the week-long test, all critical
functions, listed in the Critical Functions Report, are to
be recovered via telephonic means between the alternate
processing sites. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency
Plan, 1993, p. 936-954)
D. IMPLEMENTATION PHASE
The implementation phase describes procedures to be
followed when it has been determined to activate the
disaster recovery plan, and moves the organization from the
non- emergency preparation phase into actual activation of
the disaster recovery plan.
Depending on the amount of advance notice and type of
disaster, transition to this phase may be a smooth and
natural process. However, unforeseen or unforecasted
disasters may find organizations implementing this phase of
their disaster recovery plans with little or no lead time.
(Hural, 1992, p. 11)
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The implementation phase, or the evacuation phase
(Toigo) , is the litmus test for recovery teams formed during
the preparation phase.
There are three functional requirements to this phase:
1. The emergency must be met with an adequate response,
ranging from use of an extinguisher to suppress a small
fire, or in a phased disaster scenario, to evacuating
hardware hours before a hurricane strikes. In a phased
disaster situation warnings may be issued well in advance
of an actual disaster.
2. Assess damage caused by the disaster and determine
whether disaster declaration criteria have been met. If
the coordinator has determined the maximum amount of time
that the organization can be without critical or vital
operations (48 hours in the case of DFAS/DITSO-KC) , then
this might be the criterion for declaring a disaster. To
make this determination, site damage will need to be
accurately assessed and realistic recovery time frames
estimated.
3. Declare a disaster and invoke the plan. (Toigo,
1989, p. 162)
1. Plan Organization
For ease of use during this phase, the DFAS/DITSO-KC
disaster recovery plan is divided into three primary
sections: the Administrative Plan, Action Plan, and
Reference Information Section. These sections are described
below:
• Administrative Plan- -Contains the non-procedural
portions of the disaster recovery plan. It is intended
to be used as an educational and training tool. The
Administrative Plan also contains the Business
Resumption Program Overview, Business Resumption Program
Documentation, Plan Activation procedures and an
Appendix.
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• Action Plan- -This team- oriented section details the
specific responsibilities and procedures that recovery-
personnel would follow in the event of a disaster. The
Action Plan segment contains team- specif ic information
such as: team charter, team composition, notification,
react and support procedures and team attachments. Each
action plan component is composed of a text file, data
base report and/or graphics file.
• Reference Information Section- -This section contains
reference information. While not vital to the recovery
effort, it may be useful during the development and
ongoing maintenance of the plan. (DFAS Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 187)
2 . Using the Plan
An abbreviated, instructional section is contained
within the plan, describing initial actions all
DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel are to take at the time of a
disaster. These actions are:
• Follow the DFAS/DITSO-KC Center emergency response
procedures to ensure the safety of the employees,
visitors, and guests, and to protect the assets of the
DFAS/DITSO-KC Center.
• Designated First Alert Notification Contacts will follow
Plan Activation procedures located in the Administrative
section of the disaster recovery plan.
• Recovery Team members will comply with their specific
recovery procedures in the appropriate Action Plan
section. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 188)
3 . Disaster Alert Overview
The graphic activation flow represented in Figure 3
depicts the DFAS/DITSO-KC First Alert Response and steps
required prior to activation of the DFAS/DITSO-KC disaster












Figure 3. Disaster Alert Overview
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4. First Alert Response
Once a disaster, or any physical event (as described
in the Disaster Alert Overview) occurs, the First Alert
procedures described below ensure that management, recovery
teams and security personnel are appropriately notified
following any potentially disastrous event. These
procedures are also to be used if a non- emergency problem is
to be upgraded into a disaster alert.
Anyone (a DFAS/DITSO employee, bystander, etc.) may
perform initial First Alert functions by contacting
DFAS/DITSO- KC Security personnel on duty at the Center.
First Alert procedures are:





Determine if the disaster has affected the
DFAS/DITSO- KC Center area.
3. If the Center area has been affected, notify one of
the individuals designated as an Initial Response
Contact, and provide your name, a description of the
disaster, any knowledge you may have of damages and
injuries, and the telephone number and location where you
can be reached. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan,
1993, p. 200)
First Alert procedures are followed by a three- tiered
problem review and escalation procedure, as follows:
1. Disaster verification.
2. Damage assessment and evaluation.




This procedure mobilizes personnel identified as
Initial Response Contacts within the plan. Initial Response
Contacts are DFAS/DITSO-KC management personnel at the
division manager level or higher.
a. Initial Contact Procedures
The first person notified of the disaster assumes
responsibilities as the Initial Response Contact, and
obtains and records information such as: caller
identification, nature and severity of the event and the
caller's preliminary estimate of damage and injury. The
Initial Response Contact relieves the caller from further
responsibilities and begins a preliminary assessment of the
event
.
When the Initial Response Contact has determined
that a disaster situation exists, the Recovery Management
Team will be notified and directed to report to the Crisis
Coordination Center (CCC) . Should the Center's on-site CCC
be rendered unusable by the disaster, Management Team
members will be advised to proceed to the alternate CCC
location. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 202)
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6. Disaster Assessment and Evaluation
During Disaster Assessment and Evaluation, the
Recovery Management Team is activated to decide whether or
not a disaster should be declared and the entire recovery-
organization mobilized. When the Recovery Management Team
members assemble at the CCC, they will perform the following
duties
:
• Dispatch selected team members to reassess the extent of
damage to the facility and its contents.
• Obtain facility and content damage reports from on-site
management and/or local authorities.
• Obtain injury reports from on-site representatives
and/or local authorities.
• Review findings of the reassessment activities.
• Determine whether to activate the disaster recovery plan
or to terminate recovery activities.
• Determine the degree, or level, of disaster recovery
plan activation appropriate to the amount of damage
received, and the estimated amount of time that Center
operations will be interrupted. (DFAS Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 209)
7 . Plan Activation
After initial damage assessments are complete, the
Recovery Manager can activate the plan at one of the three
levels listed below:
1. Temporary interruption/no plan activation-
-
Facilities, equipment and daca are not seriously
affected; the problem can be handled by DFAS/DITSO-KC
personnel, building engineers or vendor personnel with a
minimum of processing and services outage.
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2. Limited activation- -Certain recovery teams, but not
all, will be activated based on the affected areas and
services
.
3. Full activation- -All recovery teams are to be
activated. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan,
1993, p. 209)
The Recovery Management Team will also inform all
recovery personnel that Management will provide the news
media with a statement as soon as possible regarding the
situation. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 210-211)
8. Recovery Team Responsibilities
During the implementation phase, the recovery teams
selected and trained by DFAS/DITSO-KC greatly effect their
organization's ability to react in an efficient and timely
manner to an impending disaster.
DFAS/DITSO-KC recovery teams will comply with the
Action Plan which describes specific responsibilities and
procedures that recovery personnel are to follow in the
event of a disaster. Specific procedures and a description
of one of the recovery teams, the End User Interface Team,
are listed below:
a. Team Composition
The fourteen-member End User Interface Team is
composed of DFAS/DITSO-KC employee specialists. Member
skills include: Financial Systems Specialists, Financial
Systems Analysts and Information Systems Specialists.
105
Jb. Notification/Assessment Procedures
Upon receipt of the disaster alert, the End User
Interface Team leader confirms that proper disaster
verification procedures have been followed. The End User
Interface Team leader, along with a copy of the End User
Interface Team procedures and employee identification,
immediately reports to the Crisis Coordination Center (CCC)
.
Upon receipt of the disaster alert, the Team leader will be
directed to proceed to either the primary or alternate CCC.
On arrival, the End User Interface Team leader
will contact team personnel already on-site, and assist
other team leaders in assessing damage to computer
operations and communications. Once the preliminary damage
assessment is complete, the End User Interface leader will
meet with other team leaders, compare assessment notes and
provide input to the Recovery Management Team on whether to
activate the disaster recovery plan.
Should the plan be activated, the leader will
contact remaining team members, using the telephone list
enclosed in the team's portion of the disaster recovery
plan. When all members have arrived, the leader will hold a
team meeting and review team- specif ic recovery objectives




Should End User Interface Team members be
required to travel to alternate processing sites, travel
arrangements will be provided by the Transportation Team.
Tickets, itineraries, advance monies and administrative
support will also be provided by Transportation Team
personnel. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993,
p. 301)
c. Team Responsibilities
In the event of a disaster at DFAS/DITSO-KC
Center, the End User Interface Team will:
• Provide user interface support to DITSO-KC.
• Provide system support for Accounting, Bond/Allotment,
Military Pay, and Active Duty/Retired systems.
• Generate customer, employee, and end user situation
statements. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III Contingency Plan,
1993, p. 304)
d. System Support
As noted above, a major portion of the End User
Interface Team's responsibilities involve system support for
operational sections within DFAS/DITSO-KC.
Examples of system support: backing up
tapes/datasets of forecasted pay and check images used to
generate payrolls until normal processing resumes, or
ensuring that Joint Uniform Military Pay System (JUMPS) mid-
month and monthly Update and Extract (U&E) data transactions
are processed in a timely manner. (DFAS-KC Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 304)
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e. Team Leader Responsibilities
The End User Interface Team Leader will:
• Activate the End User Interface Team.
• Approve situation statements/reports.
• Evaluate user needs and problems requiring DITSO
support
.
• Coordinate all user needs with DITSO.
• Provide pay system support/interface with DITSO (DFAS
Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 301).
f. Team Leader Administrative Procedures
The End User Interface Team leader, as with all
recovery team leaders, is responsible for their team
members' health and welfare.
The End User Team leader's administrative
requirements include, but are not limited to:
• Monitoring personnel for signs of fatigue, and ensuring
personnel receive sufficient rest during the recovery
operation. In order for personnel to maintain maximum
efficiency during the recovery period, the plan calls
for a minimum of eight hours rest daily.
• The return of personnel to their homes at least every
two weeks if personnel were moved to an alternate
processing site.
• Monitoring costs accrued at the alternate processing
site, and approval of payments for expenses incurred.
(DFAS Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 301)
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E. RECOVERY PHASE
The last of the four plan development phases, the
recovery phase, outlines procedures initiated after the
disaster has occurred to bring the organization back to its
original operating level.
The recovery phase restores the stricken organization to
normal pre-disaster operation, and begins when the danger to
personnel and the disaster's effects have been neutralized.
The amount of damage suffered by the organization
determines the level of recovery required. If damage was
minimal, recovery could be as easy as reestablishing
electrical power and resuming work; more extensive damage
may require shifting operations to an alternate processing
site. (Hural, 1992, p. 12-13)
1. Relocation/Reentry
Toigo's equivalent phase, relocation or reentry, is
similar to recovery concepts noted above. Relocation or
reentry refers to two options that may confront a business
following a disaster.
These options are:
1. If the original facility is salvageable, it may be
possible to reenter it once cleanup and refit activities
are completed.
2. If the facilities are unhabitable, or prohibitively
expensive to reconstruct, the business may choose to
relocate to new quarters. (Toigo, 1989, p. 168)
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In either case, there is usually an interest in
salvage, especially when expensive hardware, critical
documents on-site and other company assets are involved.
Toigo specifies the following actions to be taken
during the relocation/reentry phase:
• Systems Recovery - -Procedures to restore critical and
vital systems at emergency service levels within a
specified time frame in accordance with the disaster
recovery plan.
• Network Recovery - -The reinstatement of voice and data
communications at emergency service levels within a
specified time frame in accordance with the disaster
recovery plan.
• User Recovery - -Procedures for recovering critical and
vital user functions.
• Salvage Operations - -Salvaging facilities, records and
hardware
.
• Relocation - -Relocating emergency operations (system,
network and user) to the original or a new facility, and
the restoration of normal service levels. (Toigo, 1989,
p. 161-162)
Toigo describes more detailed, team-oriented
functions to be completed as the organization strives to
return to normal, pre-disaster operations.
A partial list includes:
• Retrieving critical and vital data from off-site
storage
.
• Installing and testing systems software and applications
at the systems recovery site.
• Identifying, purchasing and installing hardware at the
system recovery site.
• Operating from the system recovery site.
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• Rerouting network communications traffic to the recovery-
site (Toigo, 1989, p. 164-165)
.
2. DFAS/DITSO-KC Plan Usage During Recovery Phase
The DFAS/DITSO-KC Center disaster recovery plan is
designed to provide, in one volume, organizational and
procedural definitions required to guide the Center through
a recovery period following a disaster.
The plan is organized to facilitate ease of use.
The suggestions listed below are offered to assist the
DFAS/DITSO-KC personnel in attaining familiarity in as short
a time as possible:
• Read the section Administrative Plan- -Executive Overview
for a general description of the recovery process.
• Read the section Administrative Plan for a summary
description of all team recovery strategies.
• Refer to the Administrative Plan- -Recovery Organization
to view the overall recovery organization and identify
specific participants who will play key roles during the
recovery process. (DFAS Draft Level III Contingency
Plan, 1993, p. 195)
The DFAS/DITSO-KC plan is structured so that
individual members of any recovery team can detach their
specific recovery procedures from the body of the plan for
quick reference, if needed.
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3. Critical and Support Functions
Restoration of prioritized critical functions to
pre-disaster operating levels is a primary task of
DFAS/DITSO-KC recovery teams. In addition, recovery teams
may be called upon to assist and support other departments'
recovery efforts. Intra- department support functions are
defined as follows:
Tasks or support activities performed in support of
other departments' recovery efforts. These recovery
functions may be different than the normal scope of
responsibility of this department or area. (DFAS Draft
Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 195)
4 . Recovery Management Team
The Recovery Management Team, composed of directors
of all the major divisions within DFAS/DITSO-KC Center,
plays a key role in the recovery effort. Figure 4 shows the
organizational structure of the Recovery Management Team.









Figure 4. Recovery Management Team
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a. Team Duties and Responsibilities
Selected Recovery Management Team members' duties
during the recovery phase are listed below:
• Recovery Director- -Direct all recovery operations.
Notify executive management of the disaster situation
and recovery plan activation activities, conduct
recovery operation activation meetings and establish
recovery operation objectives.
• DITSO-KC Computer Operations Manager- -Activate the
required Computer Operations recovery teams, initiate
the recovery processing site disaster alert
notification, direct processing recovery activities, and
direct all data retrieval, reload and recovery
activities
.
• Director, Information Management- -Activate the required
application recovery teams, support Operations with the
recovery of systems data and the restart of applications
and direct any programming changes required for
production software or programs. (DFAS Draft Level III
Contingency Plan, p. 182-183)
5. Alternate Site Processing
If the Recovery Management Team determines that
damage has rendered the facility unusable, personnel and
equipment will then migrate to alternate processing sites,
establish communications, and begin the recovery process.
DFAS/DITSO-KC alternate processing site strategies are
listed below:
a. DFAS "Cold Site" Operations
The primary DFAS-KC "cold site" is an unused
warehouse in the greater Kansas City metropolitan area.
This site is scheduled to house several critical DFAS-KC
functions. Due to space limitations, several other cold
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sites are to be acquired for DFAS-KC operations that are
unable to use the primary cold site. These additional cold
sites will be used for an estimated two to three weeks.
Additional supplies and equipment for use at the
primary and alternate cold sites will be acquired and
distributed by a team established for that purpose. (DFAS
Draft Level III Contingency Plan, 1993, p. 172)
Jb. DITSO "Hot Site" Operations
Should a disaster render the DITSO-KC Center
unusable, DITSO-KC will shift operations to its designated
"hot site", the Marine Corps Data Processing Facility at
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Connectivity between DFAS-KC
and DITSO-KC will be provided by dial-up telephone
connections, using the Defense Switched Network (DSN)
.
Modems, FAX machines, and other telecommunications equipment
will be installed at DFAS-KC alternate sites to establish
communications between DFAS-KC and DITSO-KC alternate
processing sites.
DITSO-KC s hot site serves as an alternate
processing site for a number of other Marine Corps Data
Processing facilities. If forced to relocate to Camp
Lejeune, DITSO-KC personnel would operate under guidelines
set by the Transportable Contingency Action Plan (TCAP) , a
document containing procedures to follow should relocation
be necessary due to a disaster.
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Camp Lejeune offers the following hot site services:
• Logical Host Services.




• Printers and other peripheral devices.
• Tape Drives
.
• Points of Contact to assist in the resumption of
operations
.
Camp Lejeune possesses sufficient computing
resources to "split" its operations and provide data
processing support to affected organizations. Incoming
personnel will have billeting and messing services provided
by tenant activities. (Interview, MSgt Spaulding, USMC,
1993)
c. Alternate Site Lessons Learned
Camp Lejeune Data Center supervisory personnel
stated that facilities that had conducted successful
alternate site contingency planning exercises at the Lejeune
facility all seemed to have the following common
characteristics
:
• Updated TCAPs that meet Marine Corps standards and
guidelines
• Visiting facilities sent their most experienced data
processing personnel to participate in the exercises.




• During the exercises, visiting facilities transported
all of their backup data files to the "hot site",
testing the completeness and accuracy of their data
backup routines.
• Facilities had tested their TCAPs, on a stand-alone
basis, prior to relocating to Camp Lejeune. (Interview,
MSgt Spaulding, USMC, 1993)
F. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Advantages
The DFAS/DITSO-KC disaster recovery plan is a
well -prepared, single- source document containing all of the
pertinent reference sources and procedures for recovery
personnel to use in the event of a disaster at the Center.
As such, it has many advantages for the user. They are:
a. A concise set of instructions, separated by Recovery
Team, are easily located within the plan. Instructions
are not covered in excessive detail, and do not mask the
plan's true intent. As written, these instructions
should enable the plan user to function efficiently at
the time of a disaster.
b. The plan is easy to read and understand. Commonly-
used terms, vice complex acronyms and abbreviations, are
used throughout the document
.
c. Initial contact telephone numbers are listed with
each individual recovery team. Each recovery team member
is listed with primary and alternate numbers to be used
by contact personnel.
d. Logistical requirements for personnel deploying to
alternate processing sites are well-defined within the
plan.
e. Critical functions, in order of priority, have been
identified by DFAS/DITSO-KC. Following a disaster, these
functions are to be restored in order of importance,
restoring the Center to pre-disaster operating levels.
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2. Disadvantages
No plan is without disadvantages. While the
DFAS/DITSO-KC plan is an extremely well -prepared document,
showing insight and care in its preparation, there are areas
that could be improved, as listed below:
a. Telephone numbers and individual names are listed
within the body of the document. Should names/numbers
change, it will be a complex administrative burden to
alter the plan to reflect them. Placing information of
this sort in an Appendix would make the change process
much easier.
b. The DFAS/DITSO-KC disaster recovery plan is massive,
consisting of nearly 1000 pages of printed material. To
the first- time user, the plan would appear intimidating
due to its sheer bulk. Efforts are being made to
condense/remove redundancies. In future, team members
will only retain for reference those portions of the plan
that pertain to their specific recovery team. Complete
copies of the plan will be retained at each workcenter
and in off-site storage.
c. There is inadequate guidance pertaining to the
transfer of backup data from off -site storage to
alternate processing sites. This is an area that should
be rehearsed in a benign, non-disaster setting. Backup
data is especially vulnerable during transport if




This thesis has analyzed disaster recovery planning at
three DOD computer facilities: the DFAS/DITSO Kansas City
Center and two U. S. Air Force organizations.
Of particular interest was the impact of contingency
planning measures at Clark AFB, Philippines and Homestead
AFB, Florida following significant natural disasters.
Worthwhile characteristics of these disaster plans were
discussed at length; equally as important was the
examination of how these plans could have been more
effective.
From this evaluation, lessons learned have been
documented that should help DOD information managers to
identify and correct possible weaknesses in their
facilities' disaster recovery plans.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
1. DFAS/DITSO-Kansas City
Each selected facility had prepared a disaster
preparedness plan. Of these, DFAS/DITSO- KC was engaged in a
complete reconstruction of their existing planning document.
This reconstruction resulted in a comprehensive contingency
plan that appears to meet their requirements.
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The new DFAS/DITSO-KC plan has many advantages. It
is easy to read and understand. Instructions and procedures
are not covered in excessive detail and do not mask the
plan's true intent.
Toigo (1989) stated that a disaster plan is only as
good as the testing that accompanies it. DFAS/DITSO-KC
planners have prepared a detailed series of tests to check
the plan's effectiveness during a number of practice
disaster scenarios. These tests will evaluate alternate
site operations, backup data recovery and other criteria.
Supervisory personnel are to monitor, evaluate and debrief
each test.
The DFAS/DITSO-KC plan contains minor procedural and
administrative disadvantages. Planners are in the process
of rectifying administrative drawbacks; realistic testing
should resolve procedural deficiencies.
2 . Clark Air Force Base
Clark Air Force Base contingency planning was
severely tested by the eruption of Mount Pinatubo.
Until the spring of 1991, the Clark Data Processing
Center had not considered volcanoes as a threat to the
facility. It was a reasonable assumption, in that nearby
Mount Pinatubo had not shown any signs of activity for over
200 years.
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Lacking formal guidance, the innovative "Volcano
Plan" was formulated by an experienced DPC computer
technician to cope with Mt . Pinatubo's eruption.
Problems were encountered in obtaining satellite
communications during the recovery effort. The Volcano Plan
worked well but was hampered by the cancellation of
alternate site operations.
Disregarding the obstacles encountered, the DPC's
recovery from "the eruption of the century" was a success.
Miraculously, no lives were lost. The facility resumed
processing operations and backup data were preserved.
This success was largely due to the bravery and
professionalism of the mission-essential team that remained
behind at Clark. Adapting to danger, adversity and the
base's uncertain future they safeguarded vital backup data,
activated alternate site operations and resumed processing
in a timely manner.
Unfortunately, their efforts were for naught.
Clark's future had been in doubt for years by the time the
volcano blew. Coming in the middle of U. S .- -Philippine
basing rights negotiations, the explosion only hastened what
may have been inevitable- -the abandonment of Clark AFB.
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3 . Homestead Air Force Base
The devastation of the Homestead Base Communications
and Computer Center (BCCC) and the subsequent recovery-
operation should provide much useful information for DOD
contingency planners.
The BCCC was well prepared; hurricanes were
identified as a threat to the facility and appropriate
measures were in place to safeguard the facility's personnel
and equipment
.
The BCCC's Emergency Action Procedures (EAP) were
regularly tested. The plan was updated to reflect the
Regionalization of the BCCC and was current at the time of
the hurricane. The facility appeared able to withstand a
disaster.
Notified of the approaching hurricane, well -trained
BCCC personnel installed specially-made plastic covers over
computers and communications equipment, secured classified
materials and evacuated the facility prior to the storm.
However, no amount of disaster planning and
preparation could have protected the BCCC from Hurricane
Andrew, the most destructive natural disaster in U. S.
history. (Gore, 1993, p. 15)
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The storm devastated Homestead's data processing
facility, ripping off most of the roof and soaking the
interior with rainwater. Environmental control equipment
(air- conditioners and humidifiers) was damaged; exposed to
the elements, plastic- covered equipment retained moisture
and corroded in the humid Florida environment.
Even though the Homestead facility was severely
damaged, BCCC disaster planning measures were effective.
Backup data were saved, processing promptly resumed and,
most importantly, no lives were lost.
BCCC personnel proved that disaster preparedness
training pays off. The airmen that secured the facility
knew their responsibilities, followed EAP procedures and
carried out their duties without hesitation.
Regional commands demonstrated high levels of
cooperation. Homestead functional users relocated to
MacDill and Patrick AFBs and resumed operations not yet
performed by the Regional Processing Center.
Bureaucratic snarls were avoided; communications
links were routed to MacDill and Patrick, facilitating data
transmissions with the Gunter RPC.
Above all, Hurricane Andrew proved the utility of
the Regionalization concept. Prior to the storm, most of
Homestead's computer assets had been relocated to the Gunter
RPC. Therefore, most of the customary disaster recovery
steps- -and the associated delays- -were avoided.
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Via an established communications link, data were
backed up and stored on a regular basis. Homestead's
functional users were able to migrate to the Gunter RPC,
access their backup data and quickly resume operations.
The aftermath of the storm revealed a weakness in
the regional processing concept, the lack of an alternate
processing site for the Gunter RPC. Had Gunter, the first
of five planned RPCs been disabled it would have crippled
Air Force data processing operations in the Southeastern
United States. RPCs will ultimately act as each other's
backup sites, but until more are completed, difficulties
would arise should an RPC be destroyed.
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a. Data Collection and Analysis
b. Environmental Hazards
7. Backup Operations
8. Off -Site Storage
9 Alternate Site Processing
10. Recovery Team Personnel and Training










2. Using the Plan
3 Disaster Alert Overview
4 First Alert Response
5. Disaster Verification
6. Disaster Assessment and Evaluation
7. Plan Activation




d. Team Leader Responsibilities
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Team Leader Administrative Procedures
RECOVERY PHASE
1. Relocation/Reentry
2. Critical and Support Functions
3. Alternate Site Operations
a. "Cold Site" Operations
b. "Hot Site" Operations
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